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DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE STOCK EXCHANGE:
RECONCILING SELF-REGULATION AND THE
NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
Onnig H. Dombalagian *
In recent years, stock exchanges have been squeezed between
the two fundamental principles of exchange regulation advanced
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"):
competition and self-regulation. As venues for trading securities,
they have been challenged by alternative trading systems
("ATSs") and increasingly automated market maker and broker-
age firms, who have unrelentingly demanded a more level regula-
tory playing field.1 As quasi-regulators, the adequacy of their ef-
forts to discharge their self-regulatory responsibilities has been
called into question by recent corporate governance scandals and
instances of misconduct on exchange trading floors.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. B.A., 1992, Harvard
University; J.D., 1995, Harvard University. I would like to express my gratitude to David
Lipton, Daniel Posin, Maijorie Kornhauser, Stephen Williams, John Polise, and Marcilynn
Burke for their invaluable comments on prior drafts of this Article and for their instruc-
tive insights on many of the issues raised herein. I would also like to thank C. Alex Bahn,
Dan Russell, Sarah Kittleman, Jennifer Caviness, and Jauna Davis for their research as-
sistance.
1. E.g., Market Structure III: The Role of the Specialist in the Evolving Modern Mar-
ketplace: Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Govern-
ment Sponsored Enterprises of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. (2004)
[hereinafter 2004 House Hearings] (statements made by senior corporate officers repre-
senting several financial institutions); Regulation NMS and Developments in Market
Structure: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
108th Cong. (2004) (statements made by senior corporate officers representing several fi-
nancial institutions); Reviewing U.S. Capital Market Structure: The New York Stock Ex-
change and Related Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance
and Government Sponsored Enterprises, of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 108th
Cong. (2003) [hereinafter 2003 House Hearings] (statements made by senior corporate offi-
cers representing several financial institutions).
2. E.g., Securities Industry Association, Reinventing Self-Regulation: White Paper
For The Securities Industry Association (2000), at http://www.sia.com/marketstruture/
html/siawhitepaperfinal.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) [hereinafter SIA White Paper];
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Congress gave little guidance to the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (the "SEC" or "Commission") in amending
the Exchange Act in 1975 (the "1975 Amendments") regarding
how to balance the dual role that exchanges play in the securities
market.3 The 1975 Amendments advanced the principle that pri-
mary exchanges must use their self-regulatory power to regulate
issuers and broker-dealers. The Commission's mandate to create
a national market system, adopted within the same Amendments,
proceeded from the premise that monopoly power of the primary
stock exchanges should be restrained to promote greater competi-
tion among markets. These competing principles have forced the
Commission to take very nuanced-if not irreconcilable-
positions in various recent market structure initiatives, such as
exchange registration,4 best execution,' and exchange govern-
ance.
6
It may yet be a mistake, however, to dismiss the "myth" that
the primary responsibility for market regulation should rest with
market professionals themselves.7 Self-regulation creates a spe-
cial relationship between the Commission and the self-regulatory
bodies with the power to dictate norms for public companies, bro-
ker-dealers, and other market participants. This Article proposes
Responding to Chairman Levitt's Call: A Plan for Achieving a True National Market Sys-
tem, WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE, Feb. 29, 2000, at http://webpage.pace.edu/pviswanath/class/
articles/aeg4e43/SecurtiesTrading/brokerdealerjreport.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005);
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, American Bar Association, Special Study
on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487,
1490 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Market Structure Study]; see also Laurie P. Cohen & Kate
Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street Regulate Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec.
31, 2003, at Al; Editorial, The Post-Grasso Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at A24;
Deborah Soloman et al., SEC May Harden NYSE Stance, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2003, at C1.
3. See generally Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 [hereinafter
1975 Amendments].
4. Regulation of Exchanges and Attention Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242,
249) [hereinafter Regulation of Exchanges].
5. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 49,325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126 (Mar. 9,
2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 240, 242, 249) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation
NMS]. At the time of publication, Regulation NMS was a proposed rule.
6. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69
Fed. Reg. 71,256 (Dec. 8, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Concept Re-
lease]; Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulating Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126 (Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Fair Administra-
tion and Governance Release].
7. See, e.g., Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Market: A Critical Ex-
amination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 855 (1985).
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a modified regulatory framework for the securities marketplace
that seeks to preserve the unique benefits of self-regulation by
reallocating certain, but not all, self-regulatory responsibilities
from exchanges to a more representative set of market partici-
pants. "Demythologizing" the exchange, without abandoning self-
regulation, may ease the transition from the "exchange"-centered
regulatory regime of the Exchange Act to the market of the
twenty-first century.
Part I of this Article provides a brief summary of the history of
stock exchange regulation. Part II provides an overview of the
general framework for exchange self-regulation, including the
premises for and the ambit of exchange self-regulation. Part III
discusses the challenges faced by exchanges as competing market
centers in the securities marketplace. Part IV explores some of
the issues that the Commission has faced in reconciling these two
objectives under the Exchange Act, and Part V outlines a modi-
fied framework for resolving this tension consistent with the
competing goals outlined by Congress, the Commission, and the
securities industry.
I. HISTORY OF STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION
A. Origins
The history of the formation and regulation of stock exchanges
is well-documented.8 Stock exchanges were formed as professional
associations of securities brokers seeking to profit from the eco-
nomic expansion and industrialization of the nineteenth century.9
Brokers and dealers-the intermediaries who execute securities
transactions for investors-sought to enhance their stature and
8. See generally Concept Release, supra note 6, at 71, 257-58; CHARLES R. GEISST,
WALL STREET: A HISTORY (1997); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE
NEW DEAL (1970); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed.
2003); Dale A. Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Its Out Moded Specialist
System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17 J. CORP. L. 223 (1992).
9. The enthusiasm generated by the expansion of business enterprises, coupled with
the use of "limited liability" to facilitate the transferability of ownership, led to significant
public investment in corporate stock in Britain and the United States during the nine-
teenth century. See generally JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE
COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003).
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profitability by centralizing trading activity in stocks and other
securities of local interest.' ° Exchanges were developed largely to
enforce agreements among brokers to deal exclusively with one
another in certain "listed" securities and to fix commission sched-
ules for transactions with nonmember brokers and the investing
public."
Despite the exclusive access to liquidity 2 and trading informa-
tion 3 that exchange members enjoyed, competitors managed to
attract significant trading interest in exchange-listed securities.
Many off-exchange dealers provided liquidity by "making mar-
kets" in listed securities-i.e., buying and selling for their own ac-
count on a continuous basis-based on prices disseminated to the
10. For example, the Philadelphia Board of Brokers (now the Philadelphia Stock Ex-
change ("PHLX")), officially licensed in 1790, specialized in sovereign obligations of the
United States and other semigovernmental entities. A Blueprint for America's Free Mar-
kets: The History of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, at http://www.phlx.com/exchange/
history.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). The Boston Stock Exchange, founded in 1834,
initially traded the stocks of local banks and insurance companies. Why Does Boston Have
a Stock Exchange?, at http://www.bostonstock.com/about/who/why.html (last visited Mar.
26, 2005). The San Francisco Stock and Bond Exchange (now the Pacific Exchange) was
founded as a market for securities of companies during the California Gold Rush. See
About the Exchange, at http://www.pacificex.com/aboutus/aboutus-history.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 26, 2005). By 1934, there were approximately forty-three organized stock ex-
changes. Order Granting Temporary Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 27,611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890, 1895 n.58 (Jan. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Delta Release].
11. See infra note 57 (discussing the rescission or elimination of such rules).
12. See Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange As a Firm: The Emer-
gence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1007, 1012 (1990) (defining the liquidity of a market generally as the ability to buy or
sell a stock promptly, at a price rationally related to the market's existing estimation of
the firm's earnings prospects, and with information on stock prices produced and dissemi-
nated at low cost). The liquidity of a market may be measured, among other things, by the
difference-or "spread"-between the published buy and sell quotations of a market, the
number of shares available at quoted prices-or "depth"-the turnaround time for execu-
tion, and the ability of the market to absorb temporary imbalances in order flow. See Law-
rence E. Harris, Liquidity, Trading Rules, and Electronic Trading Systems, in
MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 1990-4, at 3 (1991).
13. Members had preferential access to information regarding trading on the ex-
change, whether through their direct observation of trading activity on the floor or
through the exclusive receipt of real-time information about recent trades and other bro-
kers' current buying and selling interest--"quotes." Specialists enjoyed a further advan-
tage over other market participants because they controlled the "book," infra note 17, and
the associated information about depth of trading interest and market trends. As a result,
specialists and members might profit considerably by using such information to trade
ahead of public customers. The conflicts of interest resulting from this arrangement natu-
rally engendered significant criticism of the specialist model. Oesterle et al., supra note 8,
at 241-43.
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public by the exchange. 14 Because such "market makers" were not
bound by exchange rules, they could entice customers with com-
paratively cheaper commissions. 15 Exchanges sought to protect
themselves from such competitors, among other means, by suc-
cessfully asserting an exclusive property right in their market
data to prevent such "derivative" pricing.'6 Exchanges also devel-
oped mechanisms-such as exchange "specialists"' 7-to provide
investors greater assurance that their orders would be executed
promptly and at a price reasonably reflecting prevailing supply
and demand for the subject security.i8
Exchanges and their members were also confronted by the
prospect of state and federal regulation of listed companies and
broker-dealers. The investment banking community sought to
curb onerous and inconsistent state "blue sky" legislation
throughout the United States, without inviting federal regulation
of public companies. 9 The New York Stock Exchange (the
"NYSE") and its membership likewise sought to avoid more in-
trusive regulation of exchange operations and investment bank-
ing firms within New York.2 ° To address these developments, the
14. See infra note 22.
15. Some of these markets developed into exchanges in their own right, such as the
AMEX, while others disappeared or merged into established exchanges. See Oesterle et
al., supra note 8, at 237-39 (describing the merger of the Open Board and the NYSE and
resulting innovations to the NYSE's trading system).
16. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 606 (1926); Hunt v. New York
Cotton Exch., 205 U.S. 322, 333 (1907); Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198
U.S. 236, 251 (1905).
17. The specialist differs from other dealers in that it maintains a central book that
reflects buying and selling interest at various prices and volumes in each security. Histori-
cally, a stock could have more than one specialist, but the practice of maintaining compet-
ing specialists for a single security died out on exchanges such as the NYSE as specialists
were pressured to take greater financial risk (and thus commit more proprietary capital)
to "stabilize" supply and demand in the market. H.R. Doc. NO. 88-95, pt. 2, at 64 (1963)
[hereinafter Special Study]. But see Oesterle et al., supra note 8, at 241-51 (suggesting
that the decline in competing specialists may be attributable to specialists' desire to con-
solidate their monopolistic role).
18. Exchanges sought to consolidate trading at designated times, through one or more
"calls," or auctions, to determine the price at which stocks could be bought or sold. See in-
fra note 165 (discussing auction markets). Eventually, mechanisms were developed to fa-
cilitate continuous auction trading and to disseminate current trading prices to member
firms and to the public.
19. PARRISH, supra note 8, at 21-23 (describing the Investment Banking Association's
efforts to develop uniform standards for securities offerings and limit the amount of re-
quired disclosure); SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 45-46.
20. PARRISH, supra note 8, at 21-23. New York's securities fraud statute, the Martin
Act, was virtually unopposed by the securities industry or the exchanges, allegedly be-
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NYSE and other exchanges promulgated financial disclosure and
governance standards for their listed companies as an alternative
form of "self-regulation."2'
Because stock exchanges were at the epicenter of the manipu-
lative and speculative activity that led to the Crash of 1929 and
its economic fallout,22 the hearings leading up to the adoption of
federal securities legislation largely focused on trading activity in
stock exchanges. 23 The Exchange Act 24 sought to ensure that
stock exchanges were no longer run as "private clubs to be con-
ducted only in accordance with the interests of their members,"
but as public utilities or "public institutions which the public is
invited to use for the purchase and sale of securities listed
cause of its focus on prosecuting fraud without adopting any prophylactic measures such
as licensure of dealers or registration of securities issues. Id. at 22-23.
21. On the NYSE, listing contracts were initially negotiated individually with each
issuer. In 1869, the NYSE Committee on Stock List was formed to evaluate companies for
listing based on the degree of national interest, their standing, the market for their prod-
ucts, and their stability and future prospects. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate
Governance Listing Requirements, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 325, 326-27 (2001). While firms ini-
tially resisted the NYSE's efforts to publish financial information, the threat of federal
and state legislation encouraged issuers to comply with the NYSE's disclosure require-
ments. See SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 44-46 (describing emerging state "blue sky" securi-
ties regulation). The NYSE also adopted corporate governance standards for its listed
companies to protect shareholders against abuses of corporate power. These included the
distribution of annual reports to shareholders, the requirement of an annual stockholders'
meeting, notification of changes to shareholders' rights, and a "one-share, one-vote" stan-
dard. See Karmel, supra, at 325; ABA Market Structure Study, supra note 2, at 1498-99.
22. The public's increasing reliance on trade prices disseminated by exchanges created
opportunities for market manipulation and fraudulent trading activity. "Bucket shops"
entered into off-exchange contracts with customers based on price movements in listed
stocks without ever purchasing or selling the underlying stock. Paul G. Mahoney, The Ex-
change as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1484 (1997); J. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices
Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspec-
tive, 34 J. L. & ECON. 591, 605-06. Members would engage in prearranged trades to create
the semblance of active trading interest and escalating prices in stocks-"painting the
tape." Short sellers were accused of engaging in "bear raids" in order to profit from artifi-
cial troughs in stock prices.
23. See Securities Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on
S. 875, 73rd Cong. (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds.,
1973). The first of the federal securities laws adopted as part of the New Deal financial
legislation, however, was the Securities Act of 1933, enacted "[tlo provide full and fair dis-
closure of the character of securities sold" in initial public offerings, "and to prevent frauds
in the sale thereof." Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. The complex is-
sues raised by regulation of the secondary market were deferred to the following year.
24. Section 4 of the Exchange Act created the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or "the Commission") and gave it the authority to administer the 1933 and 1934
Acts and subsequent securities legislation. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2000).
(Vol. 39:10691074
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thereon."25 Congress specifically expressed concern over the ma-
nipulation and control of quotes and trade information dissemi-
nated by the exchanges and over-the-counter markets, as well as
the impact of excessive speculation in securities on interstate
commerce. The Exchange Act contained provisions designed to
prevent known manipulative practices in the exchange and over-
the-counter markets, as well as to regulate exchange members'
trading activity and conflicts of interest.26 In addition, the Ex-
change Act also sought to regulate the obligations of issuers of ex-
change-listed securities traded in the secondary market.
The centerpiece of the Exchange Act was the registration of
and associated obligations imposed on exchanges. A registered
national securities exchange was required, among other things:
(i) to agree to comply and to enforce, so far as is within its powers,
compliance by its members with the provisions of the Act and
rules thereunder;2" (ii) to furnish certain data regarding its or-
ganization, rules of procedure, and membership, as well as its or-
ganic documents and the rules of the exchange (and amendments
thereto);29 and (iii) to provide for the expulsion, suspension, or
disciplining of members for willful violations of federal securities
laws and regulations or for conduct inconsistent with "just and
equitable principles of trade.""
To avoid the "impracticality of a burgeoning bureaucracy" that
would be "in danger of breaking down under its own weight and
25. H.R. REP. No. 73-1383 (1934).
26. For example, section 9 of the Exchange Act prohibits wash sales, painting the
tape, rumor-mongering, and other activity designed to produce artificial fluctuations in
securities prices on stock exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2000). Section 10(a) gives the Com-
mission the authority to promulgate rules governing short sales in exchange-listed securi-
ties, and section 10(b) prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of any listed or unlisted security. Id.
§ 78j(a)(1), (b). Section 11 regulates members' floor trading and specialist dealings, among
other matters. Id. § 78k(a)-(b).
27. Id. § 781(f). Such an issuer is required to register listed classes of securities with
the Commission, and to provide the Commission with information about itself and its af-
filiates, the organization, financial structure and nature of its business, its securities,
management and compensation, major shareholders, financial information, and any other
matter required by Commission rules and regulations. Id. § 781(b). The Exchange Act also
imposes requirements on communications with shareholders in connection with proxy so-
licitations. Id. § 78n(a)-(e).
28. Id. § 78f(b)(1).
29. Id. § 781(b)
30. Id. § 78f(b)(5). Approximately nineteen exchanges were exempted from registra-
tion under section 5(b) of the Exchange Acts. Id. § 78e(2).
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proving ineffective," Congress settled upon a self-regulatory
framework for regulating the activities of stock exchange mem-
bers.31 Under this framework, members of a registered national
stock exchange would be responsible for collectively governing
their activities; governmental regulation would be used only "to
supplement and supervise what in the first instance was self-
regulation of the exchanges."32 The Act imposed no requirements
on the governance structure of the exchange, on its membership,
or its purposes,3 3 although the SEC did seek voluntary govern-
ance reforms at the NYSE over the next few years, largely to di-
minish the dominance of specialists over the exchange's manage-
ment.34
Over the next few years, Congress, the Commission, and the
brokerage industry took significant steps to establish a regulatory
regime for over-the-counter brokers and dealers.3" In 1938, Con-
gress amended the Exchange Act to create a framework for volun-
tary self-regulation of broker-dealers that were not members of a
national securities exchange through "national securities associa-
31. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, S. DOc. NO. 93-13, at 139
(1973) (quoting the Roper Committee, Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 513-14 (1934)).
32. Id.
33. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 6(c), 48 Stat. 881, 886 (1934)
("Nothing in this title shall be construed to prevent any exchange from adopting and en-
forcing any rule not inconsistent with this title and the rules and regulations thereunder
and the applicable laws of the State in which it is located.").
34. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 89-90 (1938); Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Peren-
nial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. LAWYER 1347, 1356-57, 1360 (2004).
35. The Exchange Act only tangentially addressed regulation of the over-the-counter
market. Many stocks, whether listed or unlisted, as well as virtually all bonds and gov-
ernment securities, traded in the "over-the-counter" market, an unorganized network of
dealers--or "market makers," in the case of regularly traded instruments-and other mar-
ket professionals. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 140-41. After studying the conflicts of inter-
est that over-the-counter firms faced in acting simultaneously as brokers and dealers, the
Commission determined not to seek outright segregation of brokerage and dealing activi-
ties, in part due to the willingness of exchanges to adopt basic rules for the protection of
investors. SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE
SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER 110-14 (1936) [hereinafter SEG-
REGATION REPORT]. Rather, the Commission sought and obtained authority in 1936 to
regulate broker-dealers for record keeping and financial responsibility and to prohibit
fraudulent activity in the over-the-counter market. See generally 15 U.S.C. §78o (2000). In
deference to self-regulation, the Commission exempted members of a stock exchange from
certain of these requirements if they were subject to more stringent requirements under
the rules of the exchange. This deference was eliminated in 1975.
[Vol. 39:10691076
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tions," such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (the
"NASD").36 Although membership in the NASD was voluntary,37
Congress gave broker-dealers a powerful anticompetitive incen-
tive to join: NASD members were permitted to deal on preferen-
tial terms with one another in securities distributions and other
transactions, but prohibited from dealing with nonmember bro-
ker-dealers except on the same terms as are accorded to the gen-
eral public.38
The proposed framework for regulating a national securities
association and the national stock exchanges differed signifi-
cantly in that the scope of the NASD's self-regulatory responsi-
bilities was narrowly defined by statute, and the Commission had
greater authority to oversee the NASD's disciplinary and en-
forcement processes. The NASD's mandate was limited to adopt-
ing rules "designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts
and practices," to provide safeguards against unreasonable prof-
its, "to promote just and equitable principles of trade," "to protect
investors and the public interest," and "to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market." 9 The
NASD was expressly prohibited from engaging in certain anti-
competitive practices characteristic of exchanges (other than ex-
clusive dealing), such as imposing a schedule of prices or fixing
minimum commissions.4"
36. Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938). Unlike the Exchange Act,
the Maloney Act was adopted with the endorsement of several key securities industry as-
sociations-including the Investment Bankers Committee, a voluntary industry organiza-
tion that promulgated best practices-as a preferable alternative to direct Commission
regulation. S. REP. No. 75-1455, at 5 (1938); Concept Release, supra note 6, at 71,257. The
NASD is the only national securities association registered under section 15A of the Ex-
change Act. See id. at 71,257 n.26.
37. In 1983, Congress amended the Exchange Act to require each broker-dealer to be-
come a member of the NASD, unless its business is confined solely to an exchange of
which it is a member. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2000).
38. Id. § 78o-3(e).
39. Id. § 78o-3(b)(6).
40. Id. Throughout the 1940s, the Commission and the NASD jointly developed in-
spection programs and prohibitions against fraudulent and unethical practices, which
were enforced through administrative and disciplinary proceedings. Special Study, supra
note 17, pt. 2, at 541.
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B. The Special Studies and the 1975 Amendments
The number of securities issued and the volume of securities
traded in the United States increased significantly during the
rapid economic expansion following World War H.4 Securities
listings became concentrated in exchanges such as the NYSE and
the American Stock Exchange (the "AMEX"), which emerged as
the "primary" U.S. stock exchanges due to their national reputa-
tion and the breadth of their information distribution networks. 2
The NYSE sought to encourage public participation in securities
trading through a number of additional corporate governance ini-
tiatives designed to improve investor confidence in listed stocks,
such as minimum quorum rules and voting rights, antidilution
rules, standards for the independence of directors, and more rig-
orous accounting and auditing requirements.43 The AMEX, by
contrast, courted listings from issuers that could not satisfy the
NYSE's listing standards by imposing more lenient standards."
The bull market of the 1950s eventually led to a rise in securi-
ties fraud, as the understaffed Commission failed to keep up with
the growth of the securities markets and diverted resources away
from the surveillance and enforcement of stock exchanges and the
NASD. 5 Despite advances in technology, exchanges and over-the-
counter market makers had little incentive to improve their sur-
veillance efforts, trading facilities, or the dissemination of market
information. Commission investigations into the operation of the
self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") and various floor trading
scandals on the AMEX, for example, led to a major reorganization
of its governance structure in 1962 to check the dominance of its
specialists. 6
41. Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 21.
42. E.g., id. pt. 2, at 811 (discussing the prestige of the NYSE and noting that national
distribution capabilities can induce issuers to list on an exchange); id. pt. 2, at 915-18,
922-23 (discussing the decline of regional exchanges and noting that the "principal" ex-
changes were the New York exchanges).
43. See Karmel, supra note 21, at 329; ABA Market Structure Study, supra note 2, at
1500. See generally NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 303.00, 303A.06-.07, 310.00,
313.00 (2005).
44. Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1463 n.12, 1464 n.15 (1992); ABA
Market Structure Study, supra note 2, at 1500-02.
45. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 277.
46. Id. at 305-10; Seligman, supra note 34, at 1362. The securities industry also ex-
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The crisis of investor confidence prompted Congress to commis-
sion a special study of the securities markets by the Commission
staff. The Special Study, completed in 1963, covered a broad
range of matters relating to the operation of exchanges and over-
the-counter markets, as well as the effectiveness of stock ex-
changes and the NASD in carrying out their regulatory responsi-
bilities.17 In addition to examining the efficacy of self-regulation,
the Special Study produced one of the most comprehensive de-
scriptions of the processes by which exchanges and over-the-
counter markets operated. During the ensuing years, Congress
and the Commission took a number of steps to implement the
recommendations of the Special Study with respect to over-the-
counter securities, the financial responsibility of broker-dealers,
and the consolidation of market information.48 These efforts cul-
minated in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.
On the one hand, the 1975 Amendments imposed greater limi-
tations and obligations on exchanges under the Exchange Act's
self-regulatory framework, to address the "common and serious
misunderstanding" that the exchanges were not subject to Com-
mission oversight as well as the "serious deficiencies" in self-
regulation and the unfairness and inefficiencies in certain aspects
of exchange operations. 9 The amendments were to "clarify" SROs
statutory responsibilities, to regulate the rule making and disci-
plinary processes of exchanges more closely, and to increase the
Commission's authority to oversee SROs.5 0 On the other hand, the
perienced a significant "paperwork" crisis during the 1960s. Seligman, supra note 34, at
1366; see also S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 4 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 183 [hereinaf-
ter 1975 Amendments Legislative History]. Brokerage firms found themselves unable to
cope with the "back-office" paperwork-such as comparison, clearance, and settlement of
trades-and simply lost control of their records. Seligman, supra note 34, at 1366-67; 1975
Amendments Legislative History, supra, at 4. Significant delays in the settlement of secu-
rities transactions and delivery of cash or securities, together with record-keeping failures,
forced many firms into liquidation. Seligman, supra note 34, at 1366-67; 1975 Amend-
ments Legislative History, supra, at 4. The NYSE's insolvency fund was nearly depleted
by the rash of member insolvencies. See Seligman, supra note 8, at 465. The Securities In-
vestor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78l1 (2000), was adopted to address
concerns about the operational capability and solvency of brokerage firms. SELIGMAN, su-
pra note 8, at 443, 465.
47. See generally Special Study, supra note 17.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), (f) (2000) (registration of over-the-counter securities); id. §
78ccc-eee (insolvency insurance for broker-dealers with public customers).
49. 1975 Amendments Legislative History, supra note 46, at 24. See generally Special
Study, supra note 17.
50. Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 5, at 13.
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amendments gave the Commission greater authority to eliminate
"unnecessary or inappropriate burdens on competition"-such as
fixed commissions-and to apply new technology to improving the
accessibility and transparency of primary exchanges under the
rubric of a "national market system." 1
1. Strengthening Self-Regulation
One of the principal changes to the framework for exchange
self-regulation was to impose greater limitations on the exercise
of rule making and disciplinary authority by exchanges. Unlike
the NASD, whose rule-making authority was limited, exchanges
had the authority to adopt any rule "not inconsistent" with the
Exchange Act in addition to the minimum areas of exchange rule
making enumerated in the statute.52 Commission approval of new
exchange and NASD rules also was relatively informal, and
Commission approval was not necessary for changes to or repeal
of such rules.53
The 1975 Amendments significantly changed the framework
for exchanges by importing many of the features of the NASD
model. Exchanges were subjected to substantive limitations on
their rule-making authority to reflect their mission as quasi-
public organizations.54 Exchanges and the NASD were required to
publish both proposed new rules and proposed rule changes, as
well as a "concise general statement of the basis and purpose"
thereof, for public notice and comment,55 and the Commission was
required to publish its reasons for approval thereof.56 Congress
further granted the Commission the authority to amend or mod-
51. 1975 Amendments Legislative History, supra note 46, at 2. One contemporary has
suggested that the reason for the two directives was legislative compromise: the House of
Representatives favored increased SEC authority over SROs, whereas the Senate favored
a national market system. Panel Discussion: Celebrating Thirty Years of Market Regula-
tion, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 295, 309 (2003) (comments of Andrew Klein, Director
of the Division of Market Regulation, 1977-1979).
52. See supra note 33.
53. See Concept Release, supra note 6, at 71,257 (noting that federal regulations gov-
erning exchanges were not adopted until after 1934).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2000); Concept Release, supra note 6, at 71,257-58 (dis-
cussing how the federal government intended to regulate the exchanges).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2000).
56. Id. § 78w(a)(3).
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ify exchange and NASD rules, as well as to require exchanges or
the NASD to adopt new rules. 7
The 1975 Amendments also granted the Commission additional
oversight authority over SROs in making membership decisions
or in the exercise of their disciplinary and enforcement duties.
The amendments required exchanges to provide the same funda-
mental standards of due process5" as the NASD in admission and
disciplinary proceedings against its members, 9 including notice
of adverse actions to the Commission and the availability of
Commission review.6" The amendments gave the Commission ad-
ditional flexibility to impose intermediate sanctions on exchanges
for failure to carry out their enforcement responsibilities.61
The Special Study also prompted the Commission to prod the
exchanges to heighten their corporate governance standards for
public companies.62 The NASD had already begun to develop list-
ing standards, including corporate governance requirements, for
companies whose securities were quoted through its automated
quotation facility, NASDAQ,63 to enable them to qualify for ex-
57. Id. § 78s(c).
58. See Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 5, at 181 (describing the informality of NYSE
disciplinary proceedings). In Intercontinental Industries, Inc. v. American Stock Exchange,
452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit found that "[tihe intimate involvement of
the Exchange with the Securities and Exchange Commission brings it within the purview
of the Fifth Amendment controls over governmental due process." Id. at 941. Nevertheless,
it was believed that judicial review of the adequacy of process in each exchange action
would be "slow in coming and expensive to obtain." SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY: REPORT
OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, S. REP. NO. 93-13, at 151 (1973).
59. For disciplinary proceedings, these include the requirements that the SRO bring
specific charges against a member, provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing, and
identify in any adverse determination the act or practice constituting a violation of a spe-
cific rule or rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d)(1) (2000). For admissions decisions, the requirements
include notification of the specific grounds for denial of membership, an opportunity to be
heard on those grounds, and the maintenance of records as to the foregoing. Id. § 78f(d)(2).
60. Id. §78s(d)-(f).
61. Id. § 78s(g), (h).
62. See ABA Market Structure Study, supra note 2, at 1500.
63. Technically speaking, NASDAQ is not registered as an exchange, but as an exclu-
sive securities information processor for NASDAQ-listed securities registered under sec-
tion 11A(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(b) (2000). NASDAQ is currently exempt
from registration as an exchange because it is controlled by the NASD, a self-regulatory
organization. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(a)(3) (2004). Although the NASD is planning to es-
tablish NASDAQ as a freestanding entity, the completion of the spin-off is contingent
upon the Commission's approval of NASDAQ's application to register as a national securi-
ties exchange. 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 128, 130-31 (prepared state-
ment of Robert Greifeld, CEO and President, NASDAQ Stock Market). For purposes of
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emption from state blue sky securities laws.' Throughout the
1970s and 1980s, the Commission pressured the NYSE,
NASDAQ, and AMEX-the three primary listing markets-to
heighten their corporate governance standards." The Commis-
sion's ability to press for further reform was constrained, how-
ever, by the limitations of the antifraud provisions of the Ex-
change Act66 and the Commission's lack of express authority to
pursue corporate governance reforms directly through its rule-
making authority.67
2. Building a National Market System
The 1975 Amendments also gave the SEC new authority to
promote greater competition in securities trading. The Special
Study documented the significant changes in trading patterns in
listed and unlisted securities since the adoption of the Exchange
Act. First, the Special Study noted the growth in trading of
unlisted securities. From the 1930s through the 1960s, the mar-
ket for over-the-counter securities had grown sufficiently in size
that many issuers opted not to list to avoid complying with ex-
change listing requirements, even if they otherwise qualified un-
der the primary exchanges' standards.6" Because trading in
this Article, NASDAQ will be referred to as a stock exchange.
64. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The Securities Act of 1933 was
amended in 1996 to preempt state laws requiring registration or qualification of securities
"listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange, or listed, or authorized for listing, on the National Market System of the
Nasdaq Stock Market (or any successor to such entities)." 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2000).
65. See Karmel, supra note 21, at 340-43. One key success was the requirement that
listed firms maintain independent audit committees. See id. The Commission further
strengthened the independence requirement for audit committees in 2000 as part of a Blue
Ribbon study of accounting and auditing practices for public companies. Ira M. Millstein,
Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improv-
ing the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1063, 1072-73
(1999).
66. Efforts to "federalize" corporate governance standards through the antifraud pro-
visions of the federal securities laws failed. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 477-80 (1977).
67. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the Com-
mission lacked the authority under section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
modify the rules of the national securities exchanges to include a one share/one vote re-
quirement).
68. See Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 2, at 811. In 1964, Congress extended the
Exchange Act's registration requirement, as recommended in the Special Study, to
unlisted securities with 500 shareholders and $1 million in assets. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)
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unlisted securities was fragmented across multiple dealers, bro-
kers-particularly retail brokers-had to "shop around" from
market maker to market maker for the best prices.69 Second, the
Special Study noted the migration of segregated volume in listed
securities of the primary "lofty" exchange. As regional listings de-
clined,7" regional exchanges refocused their business model to
competing for orders in multiply listed securities,7 with regional
specialists and market makers dealing at the prices disseminated
by the primary exchange.72 Institutional investors, for example,
increasingly found it advantageous to send orders to regional ex-
changes and the over-the-counter markets, among other reasons,
to obtain better execution of large orders and to avoid the fixed
commission structure of the NYSE. 73
From the Commission's perspective, the rise in over-the-
counter trading and increased "fragmentation" of listed securities
trading raised several concerns. 74 First, the diversion of order
(2000); see Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 2, at 55-56; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1
(raising the asset threshold to $10 million).
69. Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 2, at 833.
70. Regional companies that had not migrated to, or were consolidated into companies
listed on, the NYSE and the AMEX sought to avoid the onerous disclosure obligations re-
quired of listed companies under the Exchange Act and to opt for the increasingly auto-
mated over-the-counter market. See Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 2, at 924; Karmel,
supra note 21, at 334; Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755,
762 (1984). By the time of the Special Study, the number of regional exchanges had de-
clined from over 100 to fourteen, of which four were low volume exchanges exempt from
registration and three were western mining exchanges. See Special Study, supra note 17,
pt. 5, at 144. As of the time of this writing, there are five registered securities exchanges
other than the NYSE and the AMEX that deal in stocks.
71. Congress and the Commission have taken a number of steps to shelter the re-
gional exchanges from these trends since the inception of the Exchange Act. See infra
notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
72. Therese H. Maynard, What is an "Exchange?": Proprietary Electronic Securities
Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
833, 859-60 (1992); Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at
the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 893 (1981). While regional spe-
cialists and third market makers dealt at prices derived from trading on the primary ex-
change, they were not subject to the primary exchange's commission schedule.
73. Maynard, supra note 72, at 859. Institutions and broker-dealers entered into a
number of other arrangements to avoid the NYSE's fixed commission schedule, such as
various reciprocal and "give-up" arrangements and various forms of nonprice competition,
such as the use of "soft dollars" to pay for investment research. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at
302-03.
74. Several scholars have criticized the Commission's preoccupation with the problem
of fragmentation in the absence of evidence to suggest that price discovery was impaired
by trading on multiple markets. See, e.g., Mark Mock, The SEC's New Regulation ATS:
Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51
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flow from the primary exchanges reduced the flow of retail orders
to the primary exchange. This was thought to impair the ability
of primary exchanges to discover the market's valuation of securi-
ties prices.75 In addition, the Commission was skeptical that indi-
vidual trades executed in the over-the-counter market were exe-
cuted at the best available prices. Despite NASD business
conduct rules, trading practices in the over-the-counter market
were governed by informal codes of conduct, and limited informa-
tion was available to the public about quotes and trade prices for
over-the-counter securities.76
Throughout the early 1970s, the SEC sought to consolidate re-
porting of transactions in listed securities from exchange and
over-the-counter markets, so that all investors would have access
to all exchange and over-the-counter transaction reports on
equivalent terms. With respect to over-the-counter securities, the
Commission encouraged the NASD to develop an automated quo-
tation system that would collect and disseminate firm bid-and-
ask quotations from market makers.77 These efforts led to the
creation of NASDAQ in 1971.78 With respect to exchange-listed
securities, in 1974, the Commission sought to mandate real-time
dissemination to the public of all completed trade information in
exchange-listed securities collected from all exchanges and over-
the-counter market makers in a "Consolidated Tape," based on
the NYSE and AMEX's ticker tape for transactions effected on
79their exchange floors.
The NYSE initially resisted Commission efforts to regulate
data dissemination, as it would have limited the ability of the ex-
changes to exploit the value of their market data vis-A-vis the
FLA. L. REv. 753, 760-64 (1999).
75. See infra note 90 (discussing price discovery).
76. See generally Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 5, at 115.
77. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 490-97.
78. Id. at 490.
79. Id. at 505. The Securities Industry Automation Corporation (the "SIAC") is the
exclusive "securities information processor" for listed securities, as is the NASDAQ Stock
Market for over-the-counter securities. The SEC's advisory committee on market informa-
tion recently issued a report considering, among other alternatives, the possibility of com-
peting consolidators for market information. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
MARKET INFORMATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR RESPONSIBLE CHANGE § V.B.7 (Sept. 14, 2001),
at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/finalreport.htm (last visited Mar.
26, 2005).
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over-the-counter market.80 In response, Congress gave the Com-
mission the express authority to create a national market system
for securities trading.8' The purpose of this mandate was to ad-
vance the goals of economic efficiency, fair competition, transpar-
ency, best execution, and the opportunity to trade without dealer
intermediation.8 2 Among other things, the national market sys-
tem legislation gave the Commission the authority to authorize or
require SROs, acting jointly, to develop and operate communica-
tions and data processing facilities for linking markets for "quali-
fied securities."8 3 At the same time, the amendments gave the
SEC the authority to eliminate certain key anticompetitive prac-
tices-such as fixed commissions-that restricted competition
among exchanges and the over-the-counter market.8 4
Over the past thirty years, the exchanges and the NASD have,
at the Commission's behest, developed additional intermarket
mechanisms under a series of plans negotiated by the exchanges
and the NASD and approved by the Commission.8 5 Real-time quo-
tations and transaction reports in exchange-listed securities are
collected from the primary and regional exchanges and the over-
the-counter market, consolidated and disseminated to the public
under the "Consolidated Quotation" or "CQ" Plan and the "Con-
solidated Tape Association" or "CTA" Plan, respectively. 6 Quota-
tions and transaction reports in over-the-counter securities quali-
fying as "national market" securities under the NASD's rules are
80. See Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act Release
No. 42,208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613, 70,619-20 (Dec. 17, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)
[hereinafter Regulation of Market Information Release].
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (2000).
82. Id. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C).
83. Id. § 78k-l(a)(3).
84. See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 473-86. It is frequently noted that such
authority was politically feasible largely because institutional investors already and mem-
ber firms had already developed methods to circumvent minimum commission schedules,
such as regional exchange memberships, give-up arrangements, and soft brokerage. Id.
Many exchange members also came to believe that greater competition would be beneficial
to the exchanges and their members by recapturing order flow that had migrated to re-
gional exchanges and the over-the-counter market. Id.
85. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAa3-2 (2004); DALE A. OESTERLE, CONGRESS'S 1975
DIRECTIONS TO THE SEC FOR THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM: IS THE SEC
OPERATING OUTSIDE THE MANDATE? 6 (Ohio State Univ., Moritz College of Law, Working
Paper No. 11, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=539723 (last visited Mar. 26,
2005).
86. Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,130-32 (describing the history and
terms of the "CQ" Plan, the "CTA" Plan, and the NASDAQ-UTP Plan).
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collected, consolidated, and disseminated under the "NASDAQ-
UTP" Plan. 7 Access to the best quotes in listed securities pub-
lished by competing exchanges and market makers was made
possible, if not practicable, through the Intermarket Trading Sys-
tem. 8 The Commission also sought to spur further technological
evolution of the over-the-counter market, through mechanisms
improving accessibility and reliability of NASDAQ market maker
quotes-particularly for smaller retail orders.8 9
C. The Impact of Automation on the U.S. Securities Markets
While the SEC charted the expansion of the national market
system, a number of private sector alternatives to traditional ex-
changes were under development. Institutional investors organ-
ized private trading systems in which they could trade directly
with one another to avoid the conflicts of interest in trading with
exchange specialists, members, and market makers.9 ° These sys-
tems sought to avoid registration as national securities exchanges
on the grounds that they provided an automated brokerage func-
tion.9 The Commission, after due consideration, ultimately chose
87. Id.
88. The Intermarket Trading System established linkages among exchanges and over-
the-counter market makers (through NASDAQ's Computer Assisted Execution Service),
protocols for ITS participants to access each other's quotes, and remedial measures for
"trading through" the price published by another participant without first attempting to
access such participant's published quote. See id.; infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the "trade
through" rule).
89. See Order Granting Temporary Approval to Establish the Order Confirmation
Transaction Service Enhancement to the NASDAQ System, Exchange Act Release No.
25,263, 53 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 11, 1998); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Ex-
change Act Release No. 21,743, 50 Fed. Reg. 7432 (Feb. 22, 1985). Many regional ex-
changes had already developed automated execution facilities to compete with the primary
exchanges. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
90. Some alternative trading systems merely facilitated "crossing" of large institu-
tional orders after hours at the closing price of the exchange. See, e.g., Portfolio System for
Institutional Trading, SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.
gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/posit042303.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). Others
provided a "price discovery" function, through which participants could publish the prices
and quantities at which they were willing to trade ("limit orders") and execute the limit
orders of other participants. See, e.g., Instinet, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter (June 8, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/instinetgroup060804.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
91. See Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, Exchange Act Release No.
35,605, 59 Fed. Reg. 8368, 8369-71 n.7 (Feb. 18, 1994) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249)
(listing no-action letters issued to sponsors of trading systems granting relief from the re-
quirement to register as a national securities exchange).
1086 [Vol. 39:1069
DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE STOCK EXCHANGE
to regulate such systems as broker-dealers, subject to additional
conditions negotiated with the Commission staff.92
The volume on such private trading systems increased during
the 1990s after several systems relaxed their admissions criteria
to include market makers.93 In 1995, following academic studies
and Commission and DOJ investigations, it was discovered that
market makers were essentially able to trade with each other at
prices that were more competitive than the prices they quoted in
NASDAQ. This allowed market makers to profit from the spread
between the two market segments: the competitive market cre-
ated by institutional trading, and a public retail market at which
market makers could collude to maintain artificially wide
spreads.94 In addition to imposing sanctions, the Commission
forced market makers to publish their hidden orders, either by
updating their quotes or by requiring alternative trading sys-
tems, then called "electronic communications networks" or
"ECNs," to publish their best-priced market maker orders in the
NASDAQ montage. 95
As the number of alternative trading systems increased during
the 1990s,96 the Commission became more concerned that such
92. See Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, Exchange Act Release No.
35,124, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,702, 66,702-03 (Dec. 28, 1994) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249)
(adopting former Rule 17a-23, which established record-keeping and reporting require-
ments for brokers and dealers that operate automated trading systems); see also Regula-
tion of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,900-01 (stating a history of proposed Rule 15c2-10
for proprietary trading systems).
93. In 1997, the Commission estimated that alternative trading systems accounted for
twenty percent of the orders in over-the-counter stocks and four percent of the orders in
NYSE stocks. Request for Comments, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg.
30,485, 30,486 (June 4, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Request for Com-
ments]. Today, alternative trading systems account for more than fifty percent of trading
in NASDAQ stocks. Moreover, as a result of competition from alternative trading systems
and other market participants, the NYSE and the AMEX only account for approximately
seventy-five percent and twenty-seven percent of trading in their respective listed stocks.
Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,128.
94. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET 12 (1996) [hereinafter
NASDAQ 21(A) REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/
nasdaq2la.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
95. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.11Ac1-1(c)(5), 240.IlAcl-4 (2004) (requiring market makers
to publish customer orders at or better than their public quote, either in NASDAQ or
through an alternative trading system integrated into an exchange or NASDAQ quote
montage).
96. Moreover, firms were rapidly developing trading systems for other instruments,
such as government and federal agency securities, municipal securities, corporate debt,
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systems remained outside the scope of formal regulation. In par-
ticular, the Commission expressed concern that institutional or-
ders placed in such systems remained invisible to the public and
were not afforded an opportunity to interact with retail orders.
Because participants in these systems were largely broker-
dealers and institutions, there was no requirement that they do
business with all members of the public on reasonable terms.
Moreover, after the market break of October 1987, the Commis-
sion became apprehensive of the capacity, integrity, and security
of such systems as well.97
In 1998, the Commission adopted Regulation ATS, which
stopped short of imposing full exchange regulation on such sys-
tems and instead imposed additional requirements to improve ac-
cess to and oversight of such systems.9" In particular, Regulation
ATS sought to enable retail investors to access orders in alterna-
tive trading systems by requiring such systems to publish their
best-priced customer orders in the national market system
through a SRO. 9 Alternative trading systems resisted these ef-
forts, however, because they viewed exchanges and NASDAQ as
competing markets.' 0 The Commission, after extended public no-
tice and comment, ultimately resolved the impasse only by re-
quiring the NASD to develop an entirely separate "alternative
repurchase agreements, commercial paper, and other money market instruments.
97. See Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,875 (describing the automation
review program for self-regulatory organizations and its application to alternative trading
systems and other broker-dealers).
98. See id. at 70,845.
99. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.303(b)(3) (requiring public display of and access to an alterna-
tive trading system's best-priced, internally displayed orders equivalent to that provided
to the members of an SRO); id. § 242.301(b)(5) (requiring systems to maintain neutral,
nondiscriminatory standards for fair access); id. § 242.301(b)(6) (imposing requirements
relating to capacity, integrity, and security of alternative trading systems); id. §
242.301(b)(7) (requiring cooperation with Commission inspections, examinations, and in-
vestigations); id. § 242.301(b)(8)-(9) (imposing audit trail and reporting requirements); id.
§ 242.301(b)(10) (imposing requirements with respect to the use of confidential customer
information).
100. Until recently, the only entity capable of sponsoring such access was the NASDAQ
market, and accordingly a series of disputes arose over the fairness and adequacy of the
access it offered alternative trading systems within its quotation montage and execution
facilities. See Notice of Amendment No. 8, Exchange Act Release No. 43,514, 65 Fed. Reg.
69,084 (Nov. 15, 2000); Notice of Amendment Nos. 5, 6, & 7, Exchange Act Release No.
43,133, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 15, 2000); Notice of Amendment No. 4, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,573, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,981 (Mar. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Notice of Amendment
No. 4]; Notice of Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 42,166, 64 Fed. Reg.
68,125 (Dec. 6, 1999) (giving notice of and soliciting comments on proposed rule changes
and numerous amendments thereto relating to SuperMontage); see also infra Part IV.B.
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display facility" for alternative trading systems and market mak-
ers to fulfill their regulatory obligations under Regulation ATS.'0 '
Regulation ATS did, however, offer alternative trading systems
the opportunity to avoid integration into NASDAQ or another ex-
change by registering as national securities exchanges and par-
ticipating in the national market system directly. Although the
Commission attempted to address issues relating to governance
requirements and self-regulatory obligations for new registrants,
few alternative trading systems responded. Those that did apply
to register as exchanges, moreover, were put on hold as the
Commission attempted to apply the self-regulatory requirements
of the Exchange Act to entities that did not resemble traditional
exchanges. °2 As a result, some alternative trading systems have
recently chosen to partner with regional exchanges to compete
more effectively within the national market system. 103
II. THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS REGULATOR
National securities exchanges are subject to a regulatory
framework under various sections of the Exchange Act described
as "self-regulation."0 4 Essentially, self-regulation gives members
of a self-regulatory organization license to set collectively the
ground rules for carrying out their business, subject to public no-
101. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 43,863, 66
Fed. Reg. 8020, 8053-54 (Jan. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Order Approving Proposed Rule
Changes] (conditioning approval on the simultaneous implementation by the NASD of a
quote and trade reporting alternative satisfying the regulatory obligations of ATSs, ECNs,
and market makers, and the dissemination of such NASD quotes through NASDAQ on an
attributed basis, such that participation in SuperMontage would be entirely voluntary). A
challenge to the adequacy of the alternative display facility was rejected in Domestic Secu-
rities v. SEC, 333 F.3d 239, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
102. See, e.g., 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 131 (prepared statement of Robert
Greifeld, CEO and President, NASDAQ Stock Market).
103. Among other pairings are the Island ECN (now INET, a subsidiary of Instinet
Holdings Incorporated) and the National Securities Exchange (formerly the Cincinnati
Stock Exchange), Archipelago and the Pacific Exchange, and BRUT and NASDAQ. See,
e.g., National Stock Exchange, News & Views, Island ECN Begins Representing NASDAQ
NMS Securities on the CSE, at http://www.nsx.com/news/default.asp#119 (last visited
Mar. 26, 2005) (stating that Island used NSX for the display of its orders); Archipelago
Listing, at http://archipelago.com/issuers/listing.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (discuss-
ing Pacific Exchange's and ArcaEx's alliance); Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ to Ac-
quire BRUT ECN, at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2004/ne-section04 054.
html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
104. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-1, 78o-3, 78q-1 (2000).
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tice and comment and Commission approval.'l 5 Self-regulation is
intended to strike a balance between "the limitation and dangers
of permitting the securities industry to regulate itself' and "the
sheer ineffectiveness of attempting to assure [regulation] directly
through the government on a wide scale." 106 The source of an ex-
change's self-regulatory power, the premises for granting ex-
changes self-regulatory authority, and the ambit of exchange self-
regulation are discussed in turn.
A. Source of Self-Regulatory Power
Self-regulation is most effective when the self-regulatory or-
ganization has the power to set baseline standards of conduct or
other standard terms of dealing for all persons involved in a par-
ticular line of business-e.g., lawyers, doctors, accountants, and
other professionals. Failure to comply with the rules and regula-
tions of the self-regulatory organization may result in a suspen-
sion, revocation, or other limitations on the right to exercise one's
profession. In the realm of securities markets, the Exchange Act
has created numerous self-regulatory organizations with exclu-
sive authority to perform certain activities, such as clearance and
settlement of publicly traded securities,0 7 providing insolvency
insurance for broker-dealers,'0 8 and drafting rules for municipal
securities transactions.10 9
105. Self-regulation differs in this respect from the internal controls and audit function
that publicly held corporations and regulated entities are required to adopt for the protec-
tion of their shareholders or customers. See Miller, supra note 7, at 859 (suggesting that
"cooperative regulation" is a more accurate description of the current regulatory frame-
work for securities markets).
106. 1975 Amendments Legislative History, supra note 46, at 22.
107. The clearance and settlement of transactions in publicly traded equity securities,
for example, is the exclusive province of the Depository Trust Clearing Corporation; simi-
lar clearing corporations exist for the clearance and settlement of other securities prod-
ucts. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2000). All broker-dealers that clear and settle transactions in
securities (approximately 412 firms as of October 31, 2001) must become members of the
relevant self-regulatory organization and adhere to its rules. Reserve Requirements for
Margin Related to Security Futures Products, Exchange Act Release No. 46,492, 67 Fed.
Reg. 59,747, (Sept. 23, 2002).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (creating the Securities Investor Protection Corporation as a
self-regulatory organization to insure market participants against the failure to maintain
sufficient funds or securities for the benefit of a broker-dealer's customers in the event of
insolvency).
109. Id. § 78o-4(b) (creating the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board).
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In the context of stock exchanges, the grant of self-regulatory
authority was premised on the ability of the exchange to exercise
dominant market power in specific securities or geographic areas.
Exchanges may come to acquire dominant market power because
the aggregation of liquidity creates a natural monopoly or be-
cause members naturally benefit from economies of scale or stan-
dardization of terms.11 ° Self-regulatory organizations enforce
their rules and the federal securities laws using the sanctions
available to them--denial of membership and its privileges.'
While such powers carry with them the threat of anticompetitive
behavior, it is the exchange's monopoly power that also gives it
the ability to carry out its self-regulatory mission." 2
The Exchange Act does not specifidally define the term "ex-
change" by reference to the potential for exercising dominant
market power. Nevertheless, the Commission has acknowledged
that a market's ability to restrict access or to condition access on
compliance with rules restricting the activities of its members
may compel exchange registration."3 One purpose of heightened
regulation of securities exchanges would be to ensure that mar-
kets exercise their power to adopt uniform rules judiciously and
in the public interest." 4 If this were the only goal of self-
110. The "network effect" inherent in securities trading dictates that the flow of cus-
tomer orders will naturally gravitate to larger markets, where the larger number of buy-
ers and sellers is thought to increase the probability of execution and improve the price at
which orders are executed. See RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE?: THE AUTOMATION,
MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 258-59 (1998); Robert B. Ahdich,
Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities
Markets, 76 SO. CAL. L. REV. 277 (2003).
111. The creation of the NASD through the establishment of anticompetitive rules of
business conduct reaffirms the idea that self-regulation can exist only when the self-
regulatory organization has some sort of dominant market power over its members. See S.
REP. NO. 75-1455, at 6 (1938).
112. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L.
607, 611, 615 (2003).'
113. 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2004) (excluding from the definition of an alternative trad-
ing system-and thus imposing the requirement to register as an exchange--on any sys-
tem that sets rules governing the conduct of subscribers other than system trading or that
disciplines its members). It is unclear, however, whether the SEC should use such a provi-
sion of Regulation ATS to automatically regulate any entity that chooses to adopt such
rules from regulation as an "exchange." Some new market entrants, for example, may
wish to adopt "exclusive participation" requirements for a limited period of time in order to
amass sufficient liquidity to become a viable market participant. Steven Vames, SEC's
BrokerTec Probe Puts a Model to the Test, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at C15.
114. See Request for Comments, supra note 93, at 30,498-99 (noting that the exchange
regulation is necessary to prevent certain systems from engaging in anticompetitive ac-
tivities with respect to access to and fees for trading); Vames, supra note 113. Some ex-
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regulation, however, the same result might be obtained by grant-
ing each exchange the flexibility to negotiate trading rules and
enforcement authority by contract and to address abuses of mar-
ket power through specific Commission regulation or antitrust
law. 115
The self-regulatory framework of the Exchange Act, as en-
hanced by the 1975 Amendments, is designed aggressively to ex-
ploit the dominant market power of exchanges to advance the
goals of the federal securities laws.116 The heightened regulatory
obligations imposed on exchanges and national securities associa-
tions therefore carry with them an implied antitrust immunity
conferred by the Exchange Act." 7 To prevent abuses of exchange
authority, both Congress hnd the courts have recognized immu-
nity from the antitrust laws "only if necessary to make the Secu-
rities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum ex-
tent necessary."
18
There is a significant question as to whether the current sys-
tem of exchange regulation is an effective means of regulating the
exercise of dominant market power; for this reason, among oth-
ers, it is often suggested that self-regulation be replaced with ei-
change rules, even if anticompetitive, are necessary for the exchange to carry out its trad-
ing function efficiency. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1489 (contrasting price protection
rules with fixed commission rules); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2000) (requiring the Com-
mission to take into consideration the promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital
formation when engaged in rule making or reviewing SRO rule making).
115. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1475-77.
116. "The [report] identified a number of causes for the securities industry's languor in
the face of great change and great opportunity: price fixing with respect to commission
rates, artificial restrictions on market making activities, unjustified barriers to access to
markets and market makers, opposition to market integration from powerful vested inter-
ests, monopoly control of essential mechanisms for dissemination of market informa-
tion .... ." 1975 Amendments Legislative History, supra note 46, at 1.
117. Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 628-33; Marianne K. Smythe, Government Super-
vised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an
Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REv. 475, 511-13 (1984).
118. Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-
3(b)(6) (limiting exchange rules to those matters necessary for the administration of the
exchange); see Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 683 (1975); United States v. NASD, 422
U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975); Smythe, supra note 117, at 502. Recent cases have confirmed
that the Exchange Act preempts the application of the antitrust laws in areas where the
Commission has the authority to regulate conduct that the antitrust would prohibit, re-
gardless of the Commission's current regulatory position. In re Stock Exchs. Options Trad-
ing Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2003); Friedman v. Salomon/Smith
Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 799-801 (2d Cir. 2002).
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ther direct SEC oversight or unregulated competition.119 While
the Commission has the power to block undesirable exchange
rules, such authority hampers the ability of exchanges to compete
effectively by requiring all significant business decisions to be
subject to public notice and comment. 120 Moreover, such authority
only prevents efforts to exercise market power through changes
in exchange rules, practices, and procedures: the section 19 proc-
ess provides no assurance that self-regulatory organizations will
act to prevent informal collusion among their members.
1 21
B. Premises for Granting Exchanges Self-Regulatory Authority
In large part, Congress's decision to grant self-regulatory au-
thority to the securities exchanges appears to be the result of his-
torical accident and political expediency. Congress needed to ad-
dress misconduct on securities exchanges, and since securities
exchanges already had an infrastructure in place for regulating
issuers and broker-dealers, it was convenient for legislators to
build the federal securities regulatory framework on this regime.
Nevertheless, regulators and commentators have articulated nu-
merous arguments why our "path-dependent" system of exchange
self-regulation remains preferable to alternative frameworks-
such as a single governmental regulator or a single self-
regulatory organization for the entire securities marketplace.122
These arguments and their merits are discussed in turn.
119. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1456.
120. The SEC has the power, under section 19 of the Exchange Act, to approve or dis-
approve of every "rule change of a self-reglatory organization," as well as the power to
amend or delete exchange rules unilaterally to ensure the fair administration of the ex-
change or in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000);
see Request for Comments, supra note 93, at 30,492 (describing attempts by the AMEX to
block competing brokers from using its order routing systems and by the NYSE to prohibit
the use of phone lines on the exchange floor to transmit market information off-board);
Notice of Amendment No. 4, supra note 100, at 16,981 (describing competitive concerns
regarding NASDAQ's proposal to downgrade the execution priority of competing alterna-
tive trading systems in its proposed order display facility based on order execution meth-
odology).
121. NASDAQ 21(A) REPORT, supra note 94, at 38.
122. See generally LEE, supra note 110, at 297-315 (describing other frameworks for
regulation of securities markets and intermediaries); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., COMPETITION
AMONG SECURITIES MARKETS: A PATH DEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE (Columbia Law School,
Working Paper No. 192, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=283822 (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
2005] 1093
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
1. Operational Familiarity and Reputation Interest
Because an exchange has an interest in ensuring that its cus-
tomers are satisfied that trading through its facilities occurs in a
fair manner, it is often argued that entrusting the regulation of
exchange members to the exchange, subject to regulatory over-
sight, is the most effective means of regulating securities trad-
ing.'23 Exchanges and their members and customers developed
contractual arrangements for dealing with the costs of monitoring
members and listed companies trading prior to the enactment of
the Exchange Act, and exchange rules often impose obligations
beyond those required under the Exchange Act. 124
Since exchange personnel have much greater technical exper-
tise with the operations of an exchange-e.g., specialist dealings
and floor trading-they are in theory better able to enforce ex-
change rules and federal securities law than an outside regula-
tor. 125 Some regulatory requirements, for example, may need to be
heightened or relaxed as market conditions dictate, or adjusted as
exchanges observe new trading patterns, concentration of posi-
tions, or other activity gleaned from market surveillance.126 Ad-
ministrative process or judicial decision making may be too cum-
bersome to address such problems.
Exchange members also have a significant interest in enforcing
certain rules against one another. Broker-dealers, like other pro-
fessionals, will naturally seek to weed out the most egregiously
incompetent or dishonest firms and individuals from their ranks.
Regulation may also serve an important anticompetitive purpose:
raising the stakes for participation in certain exchange transac-
tions-such as higher minimum net capital requirements or other
restrictions on the leverage members and their customers may
123. See, e.g., 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 86 (prepared statement of Profes-
sor John C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia Law School); NYSE, MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT 15-16
(2000) [hereinafter MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT], available at http://www.nyse.comlpdfs/
marketstructure.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
124. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1458 (arguing that exchanges, through com-
petition, will develop optimal standards).
125. David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and When?: A
Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 527, 545 (1983); LUIGI ZINGALES, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FINANCIAL MARKET
REGULATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21/2004, 2004), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=536682 (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
126. See infra note 366.
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employ in various lines of business-ensures that only a limited
number of members are able to effect such transactions.
127
Many areas of exchange regulation do not require particular
operational expertise. 12' As discussed below, there does not ap-
pear to be any nexus between corporate governance standards,
handling of customer accounts, and intermarket surveillance, and
the operations of particular exchanges. All securities exchanges
other than the NYSE have delegated enforcement of their busi-
ness conduct rules to either the NASD or the NYSE with respect
to their dual members.129 Other areas of market surveillance that
require monitoring all market activity-e.g., insider trading and
manipulative market practices-may benefit more from central-
ized regulation than self-regulation. 3 '
Moreover, there is considerable doubt as to whether exchange
self-regulation motivated by reputational interest has succeeded
in inspiring investor confidence. As commentators have noted, ex-
changes are best at punishing isolated misconduct by a "few bad
apples;" it is considerably more difficult, however, for an ex-
change to punish systemic fraud 3 ' or to prosecute aggressively
questionable market practices that are of vital economic signifi-
cance to members. 32 The Special Study further recognized that
an exchange might often be "excessively concerned with defend-
ing its members from public criticism and insufficiently con-
cerned with governing their conduct in a public market as the Ex-
change Act requires it to do."'33
127. See infra note 196 (implicating higher specialist net capital requirements in the
decline of competing specialists).
128. Miller, supra note 7, at 862-63.
129. See infra note 216. Exchanges, of course, remain responsible for regulating their
market operations.
130. As a result, exchanges and prominent industry associations have called upon Con-
gress and the Commission to distinguish between self-regulation of "markets" and self-
regulation of "members," and to consolidate regulation of the latter task into a single en-
tity-such as a governmental regulator or a single self-regulatory body-to eliminate inef-
ficiencies. See infra note 360.
131. Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation,
83 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1517 (1997).
132. LEE, supra note 110, at 191.
133. Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 5, at 177-78.
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2. Financial Ability
Self-regulation allows the government to shift the financial
burden of regulating markets and market intermediaries onto the
securities markets."' If securities trading were regulated solely
by the Commission or a single industry-wide SRO, such regula-
tion would presumably be funded either through assessments
against broker-dealers or from other dedicated sources of revenue
administered by federal law.135 Self-regulation allows regulators
to bundle industry regulation with the other services and ex-
penses in an exchange's income statement, thus "[siparing the
federal government much of the burden of securities regulation"
while obscuring the actual cost to the private sector.
136
The resources allocated by exchanges at the NASD to self-
regulation, vis-A-vis other exchange services, are difficult to de-
termine. Exchanges and the NASD derive revenues from four
principal sources: (i) regulatory fees and assessments paid by
members; (ii) transaction fees paid by persons entering into secu-
rities transactions in a given market; (iii) listing fees paid by cor-
porate issuers; and (iv) market information fees paid by consum-
ers of market information.'37 Exchanges are currently not
required to disclose how such revenues are allocated among self-
regulatory functions, such as regulation of market operations,
listing and member regulation, and their operating activities.1 38
134. 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 85-86 (prepared statement of Professor
John Coffee); Smythe, supra note 117, at 475-77.
135. See SIA White Paper, supra note 2, at 48-61. For example, the Public Company
Accounting Overnight Board ("PCAOB"), which oversees the auditors of public companies,
is funded by "accounting support fees" paid by registered issuers. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7211, 7219 (Supp. II 2003). From 1965 to 1983, the Commission
experimented with direct regulation of broker-dealers that were not members of an SRO, a
project that was ultimately abandoned due to its cost and diversion of SEC staff resources.
Concept Release, supra note 6, at 71,267.
136. Regulation of Market Information Release, supra note 80, at 70,624.
137. The Market Data Concept Release notes that, on average, regulatory fees ac-
counted for nineteen percent of an exchange's revenue, transaction fees accounted for
thirty percent, listing fees accounted for twenty-three percent, and market data fees ac-
counted for twenty-one percent in 1999. Id. at 70,625. That year, the regional exchanges
obtained most of their funding from transaction fees-forty-five percent to seventy-one
percent-and sale of market information-fourteen percent to forty-five percent. Id. The
NYSE, the NASD, and the AMEX, by contrast, were funded from a more balanced combi-
nation of these sources. Id.
138. Id. at 70,625-26. As a result of the reorganization of the NASD's regulatory func-
tions (NASD Regulation) and market operations (NASDAQ), the NASD does provide such
1096 [Vol. 39:1069
DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE STOCK EXCHANGE
Allowing the industry to fund self-regulation from exchange
revenues creates significant conflicts of interest since the quality
of exchange self-regulation may become compromised by commer-
cial considerations. Members could threaten to shift transactions
away from an exchange, and thus deprive the exchange of reve-
nue, if the exchange threatens burdensome regulation.139 Issuers
could threaten to delist if corporate governance standards are too
onerous.14 ° Investors could seek to consume less market informa-
tion-or, if permitted, purchase subsets of market information-if
data fees become too high. 141
More generally, self-funding raises concerns when revenues
otherwise attributable to the commercial activities of exchanges
and nonexchange markets become the subject of Commission
pricing and allocation. For example, while market information is
a breakdown. Based on a review of NASD's financial statements, the Commission esti-
mated that, of NASD's total expenses of $623.9 million in 1998, at least $236.6 million
(approximately thirty-eight percent) was recorded as NASD member regulation expenses
and at least $57.3 million (approximately nine percent) was recorded as NASD market
regulation, leaving $304 million for market operations and listing. Id. The SEC has re-
cently proposed to improve the transparency of SRO finances. See Fair Administration and
Governance Release, supra note 6, at 71,126.
139. Prior to 1976, various exchange rules prohibited members from effecting transac-
tions in a listed security off the floor of an exchange ("off-board trading"). See infra note
267 and accompanying text.
140. See infra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing efforts to eliminate restric-
tions on voluntary delistings).
141. The Commission's Vendor Display Rule prohibits data vendors or broker-dealers
from providing investors with quotes, last sale data, or other market information in a par-
ticular security in a particular market without also providing a data feed consolidating the
information from all other markets trading the security. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-2
(2004). The Commission has recently allowed exchanges to sell packets of data other than
each market's best-priced quote in a security as separate products. See, e.g., Regarding the
Dissemination of Liquidity Quotations, Exchange Act Release No. 47,614, 68 Fed. Reg.
17,140, 17,142 (Apr. 8, 2003) (approving dissemination of quotations below the best bid
and offer at which the exchange is able to provide greater liquidity); Relating to Fees for
NASDAQ Data Entitlement Packages, Exchange Act Release No. 46,843, 67 Fed. Reg.
70,471, 70,471-73 (Nov. 22, 2002) (approving various NASDAQ data entitlement packages
containing limit order data and additional indications of market maker trading interest
below each market maker's best quote); Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Estab-
lishing the Fees for NYSE OpenBook TM, Exchange Act Release No. 45,138, 66 Fed. Reg.
64,895, 64,895-96 (Dec. 14, 2001) (approving NYSE Open Book service, providing recipi-
ents with a compilation of limit order data for listed securities). Some trading venues dis-
tribute this information to the public for free. See, e.g., INET, Bookviewer, at http://www.
archipelago.com/tools/book/bookinfo. asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Book-
viewer] (offering broker-dealers liquidity pool access). The SEC has also proposed to man-
date public dissemination of such data as part of its Regulation NMS proposal. See Pro-
posed Regulation NMS, supra note 5.
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a by-product-or product, depending on one's point of view 42-of
an exchange's market operations, the Commission has, through
its national market system authority, regulated not only the price
at which data may be sold but also the allocation of those revenues
exclusively to SROs in the name of funding self-regulation. 4 3 This
creates incentives for exchanges and SROs to use such dedicated
sources of revenue for commercial purposes, to the detriment of
markets that do not purport to engage in self-regulation.'44
3. Voluntariness of Regulation
Imposing regulation through a self-regulatory exchange is also
thought to be politically advantageous because it has fostered the
perception that broker-dealers and issuers assume heightened
regulatory obligations voluntarily. As discussed below, self-
regulatory organizations are thought to be better able to adopt
and enforce ethical norms of business conduct with respect to
their members than a government agency. Expansion of Commis-
sion authority to proscribe "unethical" conduct would require a
"minute, detailed, and rigid regulation of business conduct by
law" that would not keep pace with evolving practices in the mar-
142. Exchanges could in theory compete not only on the basis of trades but also based
on the value of their market data. See, e.g., Mulherin et al., supra note 22, at 594, 643-44.
The Commission has long expressed concern, however, that allowing exchanges to set dif-
ferent prices for their market data may lead exchanges to price their data anticompeti-
tively to deny or restrict access to information. But see supra notes 16-18 and accompany-
ing text (providing description of data products offered by individual exchanges). The
Commission has recently proposed a formula for allocating market data fees that takes
into account the "aggressiveness" of an exchange's public quotes. Proposed Regulation
NMS, supra note 5, at 11,134-35. This raises the question whether the Commission can do
better than market forces in determining the appropriate value of market information.
143. For example, all exchanges and the NASD are entitled to share in market data
revenues in proportion to their trading activity, but alternative trading systems, market
makers, and broker-dealers are not, even though they generate a substantial portion of
the data captured and disseminated by market data systems. See Regulation of Market
Information Release, supra note 80, at 70,625. In 2003, net revenues from the sale of mar-
ket data across all national market system securities totaled $386 million. Proposed Regu-
lation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,179. While the Commission has proposed to modify the
allocation formulae to reflect the value of the information provided, there is no plan to dis-
tribute such revenues directly to non-SRO systems that generate quotation information.
Id. at 11,180.
144. This may be done by "sharing" market data revenues with members based on the
volume of orders or transactions they bring to the exchange for execution. See Proposed
Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,156-57 (describing various exchange revenue sharing
arrangements).
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ketplace. 45 Since exchanges depend on SEC approvals to imple-
ment their own commercial and regulatory initiatives,'46 ex-
changes may seek to adopt rules upon a "suggestion" or "raised
eyebrow" from the SEC, thus eliminating the need for federal in-
teruption.'47
The Exchange Act offers issuers and broker-dealers the option
to list on or become members of an exchange and comply with its
standards of conduct as a means to differentiate themselves from
their competitors.' This facilitates tiering of market participants
without the need for the Commission to establish multiple listing
or broker-dealer standards.'49 It also removes more controversial
corporate governance or business conduct proposals out of the po-
litical area in which Congress and the Commission operate until
the effectiveness of implementing and enforcing such rules can be
demonstrated on a subset of companies or broker-dealers that
"voluntarily" undertake them.1 50
For example, despite the lack of general Commission authority
to adopt corporate governance rules for listed companies, the
Commission has enjoyed some success as discussed above in
145. REGULATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS, S. REP. No. 75-1455, at 3 (1938).
The SEC has, however, considered standards-based regulation for SROs in certain circum-
stances. See, e.g., Request for Comments, supra note 93, at 30,494-95; Lipton, supra note
125, at 537-40.
146. See infra note 338 (describing the SuperMontage controversy).
147. Lipton, supra note 125, at 536; Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate
Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 571 (1984).
148. Since 1983, all broker-dealers have been required to be members of a self-
regulatory organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2000). The Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, gave the Commission the authority to adopt and
enforce certain business conduct standards for broker-dealers that sought not to become
members of an exchange or the NASD. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)-(10) (1964). Pursuant to that
authority, the Commission adopted a rule regarding suitability of recommendations to
customers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1983). Congress terminated this program in 1983 by
Pub. L. No. 98-38, since it was felt that SROs had more flexibility to enforce such stan-
dards than the SEC. See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-
Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 206-07 (1995); Proposed
Rule Change; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Conversion of SECO Bro-
ker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 20,273, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,560 (Oct. 12, 1983).
149. See, e.g., ABA Market Structure Study, supra note 2, at 1503; Poser, supra note 72,
at 901-15 (describing the failed attempt at developing tiered standards for national mar-
ket system securities).
150. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed a bill that would pre-
empt a recent accounting principle regarding stock option expensing promulgated by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board. Stock Option Accounting Reform Act, H.R. 3574,
108th Cong. (2004); see also Floyd Norris, When Politicians Write Accounting Rules, Real-
ity Can Be Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at C1.
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prodding exchanges to adopt and enforce listing standards in spe-
cific areas without the need for rule making or legislation.151 The
existence of multiple SROs has also proven to be helpful in devel-
oping best practices for brokerage firms, particularly in the area
of financial responsibility. While many trade associations may
perform the same functions, only an SRO has the ability to en-
force compliance with such practices.5 2
4. Industry Accountability
Exchanges also serve as publicly accountable representatives of
the securities industry. As associations of broker-dealers with the
power to bind their members, exchanges serve as a useful foil
with which regulators and legislators can publicly negotiate for
reforms in the securities industry. The NYSE, as the self-
regulatory authority for the preeminent investment houses on
Wall Street, occupies a unique place in these discussions. The
NYSE and its personnel are regularly represented in many major
public policy discussions on securities market reform, in no small
part because the exchange has the ability to negotiate voluntarily
remedial measures on behalf of major firms in lieu of individually
negotiated settlements or tailored injunctions.
C. Ambit of Stock Exchange Self-Regulation
To prevent abuse of the exchange's implied antitrust immunity,
the scope of each exchange's self-regulatory power and responsi-
bility must be defined.153 Unlike the pre-1975 regime, the Ex-
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. With the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Congress and the Commission have renewed their reliance on exchange and
NASDAQ listing standards to improve corporate governance practices.
152. Cf. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking
down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act establishing a National Recovery
Administration to oversee voluntary compliance with industry codes of competition).
153. Even in the case of SROs that ostensibly have a statutory monopoly on a particu-
lar market service, the Commission must be careful to ensure that the SRO does not use
its monopoly power to establish a competitive edge in the provision of related services
through "tie-in" arrangements. See, e.g., 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 24
(statement of Rep. David Scott) (referring to a proposed rule change of the National Secu-
rities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC") that would allow the NSCC to provide certain mes-
saging services provided by private sector participants); Notice of Filing of Amendment
Nos. 2 and 3 to Proposed Rule Changes by National Association of Securities Dealers, Ex-
change Act Release No. 43,616, 65 Fed. Reg. 71,174 (Nov. 29, 2000) (eliminating, in light of
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change Act provides that the rules of a national securities ex-
change may not extend to matters "not related to the purposes of
[the Exchange Act] or the administration of the exchange."'54
Naturally, exchanges have developed rules and regulations relat-
ing to the core business services they provide, such as standard-
ized terms of trading, clearance and settlement, dispute resolu-
tion, and liquidity provision. 5 5 Substantive exchange rules of
regulatory concern may be generally grouped into three catego-
ries: (i) rules regulating exchange transactions; (ii) rules govern-
ing listing of public companies; and (iii) rules governing members'
handling of public customer business.
1. Regulating Exchange Transactions
The regulation of exchange transactions was one of the key
reasons for the promulgation of the Exchange Act in 1934. To the
extent that exchanges such as the NYSE exercised dominant
power with respect to both the volume of transactions effected as
well as the price discovery process that established market prices,
legislators and regulators saw great potential for abuse of power
by exchange members. Thus, regulators took particular interest
in the manner in which trades were executed, the right of special-
ists to intervene in the execution of trades, and the right of other
members to profit from their privileged position in the market.
Regulators also sought to ensure that exchanges took responsibil-
ity for monitoring abusive practices and taking appropriate action
to restore the integrity of markets.15
As exchanges become more competitive with other markets, the
justification for regulatory oversight of these processes becomes
increasingly less important. In particular, the struggle to articu-
late the obligations of exchange members and specialists with re-
spect to customer orders has both failed to resolve the essential
conflicts of interest on an exchange floor and have hindered, to
some degree, the ability of exchanges to compete. Moreover, the
competitive concerns, a proposed clearing and risk management service to accompany a
mandatory transaction reporting service for corporate debt securities operated by
NASDAQ).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2000).
155. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative
Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 22 (1999).
156. H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 1-5 (1934).
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existence of multiple markets has long called into question the
ability of exchanges to monitor unusual market activity or to de-
tect improper trading patterns. Each of these aspects of exchange
regulation is discussed in turn.
a. Trading Rules
Exchanges facilitate execution of securities transactions by
bringing together the orders of buyers and sellers of securities.
According to the SEC's most recent interpretation of the statutory
definition,157 the hallmark of an exchange is that execution takes
place through some established, nondiscretionary means that al-
lows orders to interact directly.15 Assuming that prices are best
"discovered" by the interaction of buying and selling interest,5 9
157. The Exchange Act definition does not provide much additional guidance:
The term "exchange" means any organization, association, or group of per-
sons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains,
or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally
understood, and includes the market place and the market facilities main-
tained by such exchange.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2000). The "plasticity" of Congress's definition reflects the contempo-
raneous view that the term was "self-explanatory" and that a narrowly tailored definition
might encourage exchanges to evade regulation. See Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525,
535 (7th Cir. 1989); 1975 Amendments Legislative History, supra note 46, at 211. Collo-
quially, an exchange may be defined as a place for organized trading of stocks or other fi-
nancial instruments and the performance of ancillary services that are associated with
stock exchanges. See LEE, supra note 110, at 322-23; LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 604 (3d ed. 1995) ("The hallmark of a stock
exchange historically has been the centralization of trading on an exchange floor.").
158. For example, assume customer A submits an order to buy 1000 shares at $10.10
per share and customer B submits an order to sell 1000 shares at $10.05 per share. In the
over-the-counter market, two different market makers might handle A's order and B's or-
der, such that A gets an execution price of $10.10 per share and B gets an execution price
of $10.05 per share. In an exchange market, A and B theoretically have an opportunity to
interact-assuming their orders arrive contemporaneously, see infra notes 191-92-such
that one or both will receive a better price: A might be able to purchase from B at $10.05
per share, or B might be able to sell to A at $10.10 per share.
159. LAWRENCE HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES § 5.3.2, at 94-95 (2003). Essentially,
prices are discovered on an exchange through the interaction of orders submitted by buy-
ers and sellers. Buyers who are willing to "bid" up the price of a security and sellers pre-
pared to "offer" lower prices to prospective purchasers telegraph to the broader market-
place their estimation of the value of a security. The aggregation of such bids and offers
produces the exchange "quote." The more bids and offers submitted to a market, the more
accurately the quote reflects the market's valuation of a security. A market consisting
solely of dealers also engages in price discovery, see id. § 13.6.1, at 284-85, although such
a market cannot produce a single bid and offer without establishing a means for consoli-
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exchange rules should therefore be designed in a manner that
maximizes the "opportunity... for investors' orders to be exe-
cuted without the participation of a dealer."16 °
One purpose of regulating the trading processes of exchanges
would thus be to ensure that exchanges do not compromise their
trading rules.161 Defining exchanges in this manner preserves the
"stamp of reputability" that investors associate with an exchange
execution, insofar as the rules of an exchange minimize opportu-
nities for exchange intermediaries to extract profits from ex-
change trades. 162 Thus the Commission has taken great care to
reserve the right to designate who may call itself an exchange 16 3
and has required broker-dealers to advise their customers
whether they have obtained an exchange execution in connection
with each transaction.
164
Designation of exchange markets is thought to benefit not just
the exchange and its customers, but the marketplace as a whole.
Exchange rules are designed to encourage informed investors to
dating bids and offers and resolving quotes that "lock" or "cross" one another. See, e.g.,
NASD Rule 4613(e).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(v); see, e.g., LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec.,
523 F. Supp. 819, 834-35 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that UMIC was not an exchange be-
cause it interposed itself in transactions and did not allow direct order interaction).
161. In connection with Congress's grant of exchange trading privileges to unlisted se-
curities, it was noted that "[tihe protections inherent in exchange-type trading should be
afforded to investors in all securities with suitable characteristics and should not be de-
pendent upon the decision of corporate management to 'list.'" 1975 Amendments Legisla-
tive History, supra note 46, at 19.
162. See Special Study, supra note 17, at 40, 41, 50. Naturally, decentralized markets
such as NASDAQ and over-the-counter market makers in exchange-listed and NASDAQ
listed securities have pointed to conflicting evidence over the "quality" of executions on a
centralized exchange versus the fragmented over-the-counter market. In December 2000,
the SEC developed a series of metrics for assisting investors in determining the quality of
execution of certain types of orders on each market center. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lAcl-5 (2004).
Market centers have naturally disputed the meaning of those statistical measures. Disclo-
sure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 43,590, 65 Fed.
Reg. 75,414 (Dec. 1, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
163. A trading venue may not call itself an "exchange"-even if it performs an auction-
type execution and otherwise fits within the definition of an exchange-if that venue is not
registered as a national securities exchange. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(11) (2004) ("The alter-
native trading system shall not use in its name the word 'exchange,' or derivations of the
word 'exchange,' such as the term 'stock market.'"). It is not clear, however, whether using
the letter "X" prominently would violate this rule. See, e.g., http://www.nextrade.com (last
visited Mar. 26, 2005).
164. For example, customer confirmations must disclose whether a trade is executed on
an exchange or by a "dealer" in the over-the-counter market, but not, for example, whether
a trade actually interacted with other orders or with a specialist or market maker's book.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2004).
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reveal the maximum or minimum price at which they are willing
to buy or sell by guaranteeing that their "limit" orders will be
granted priority of execution within its facilities. 165 Designation of
a market as an exchange signals that other markets-such as the
over-the-counter market, the options and futures markets, or the
market for negotiated derivative transactions-may reasonably
rely on the prices generated by the exchange.166
While both traditional floor-based exchanges and modern al-
ternative trading systems rely on priority rules to govern the in-
teraction of orders, 16 different markets may provide different sets
of priority rules and permit greater discretion for market inter-
mediaries to trade within the parameters set by those priority
rules. 168 Despite some objections, both Congress and the SEC
have rejected the notion that all securities trades should be proc-
essed in a single market, or subject to a single algorithm. 69
165. In a pure auction market, the bid-ask spread represents the best buy and sell or-
ders with associated prices ("limit orders"). Price discovery takes place as either (i) addi-
tional limit orders that either improve the bid or asked price or the size of the quote at the
bid or asked price, or (ii) market orders or marketable limit orders are executed against
the prevailing bid or asked price, thus "moving the market" to the next highest bid or next
lowest ask price.
166. For example, NASDAQ recently created a Closing Cross procedure for securities
in the NASDAQ-100 index, among others, in order "to create a more robust close that
would allow for price discovery, and an execution that would result in an accurate, trad-
able closing price." Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the NASDAQ Closing Cross, Exchange Act Release No.
48,878, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,098, 69,099 (Dec. 11, 2003); see Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., Through Its Subsidiary the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., Relating to the
NASDAQ Closing Cross, Exchange Act Release No. 40,496, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,879 (Mar. 18,
2004) (approving proposed rule change).
167. For example, customers may wish to attach detailed instructions to orders regard-
ing visibility to the public, duration of the order, the conditions under which the order is to
be executed, canceled or modified, or parameters for negotiation of the final trade price
with other market participants. Different exchanges and trading systems have different
order types reflecting these options. Exchanges must naturally strike a balance between
affording customers too many order types (which would inhibit development of sufficient
trading volume) and too few (which would discourage investors from submitting orders
that are sensitive to market developments). See Harris, supra note 12, at 17-19 (noting
that exchange rules typically entail a composition of priorities based on price, display
status, time, and size).
168. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1458. For example, the SEC appears to have classified
NASDAQ's Level 2 quote montage as an "exchange" in so far as market makers are re-
quired to display quotes and accept executions at those quotes pursuant to established
rules. See Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4.
169. See, e.g., Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, "Regulation NMS and Securi-
ties Market Structure," Statement No. 205 (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.aei.org/
publications/pubid.20576/pub-detail.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (noting that Regula-
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Though consolidation of all trading into a single "central limit or-
der book" would ensure identical treatment of all orders and
theoretically improve price discovery,17 ° the Commission has rec-
ognized that different classes of investors may prefer different
permutations of these priority rules. 1 ' Similarly, investors may
demand that exchanges differentiate among pools of liquidity
with different characteristics. 72
For example, many successful trading systems offer very strict
priority rules for executing customer orders for institutions and
other "informed" investors trading on the basis of proprietary
analysis of stock values. 7 3 These systems succeed partly because
of their ability to hide portions of their trading interest from pub-
lic view, thus eliminating the adverse selection problem posed by
public limit orders on an exchange.' 74 Others have sought to relax
tion NMS fails to address the central issue of whether a marketplace with centralized
trading is preferable to one with competing trading venues); SIA White Paper, supra note
2. Advocates of a central limit order book ("CLOB") believe that price/time priority is the
fairest way to execute customer orders, or at least retail orders. See, e.g., Yakov Amihud &
Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Securities Trading Across Markets,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1414-15, 1431-32; (1996); Morris Mendelson & Junius W. Peake,
Intermediaries' or Investors': Whose Market Is It Anyway? 19 J. CORP. L. 443, 482 (2000).
170. But see Klock, supra note 74, at 760-64 (rejecting the idea that fragmentation im-
pairs price discovery). Forced consolidation of order flow within the United States could
cause institutional investors to execute orders outside of the United States in after-hours
trading. This was one common method of avoiding the NYSE's off-board trading prohibi-
tion. See infra note 283.
171. In some cases, moreover, investors may prefer to waive all protections for their
orders, if necessary to avoid signaling the size of their trading interest to the public. The
discovery that specialists were handling orders that were technically "not held" and not
subject to the exchange's priority rules was one of the surprising findings of the Special
Study. Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 2, at 146-47.
172. For example, priority rules have traditionally been relaxed for block orders and
large orders, which are typically negotiated "upstairs" before being brought down to the
exchange floor for execution. Many systems also provide subscribers with the ability to
trade anonymously-i.e., concealing their identity through the time of execution or settle-
ment. See, e.g., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No.
48,527, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,361 (Sept. 30, 2003) (approving proposed NASD rule change ex-
tending anonymity of orders submitted to SuperMontage beyond execution).
173. Many alternative trading systems, for example, offer a pure auction system and
suffer from no conflicts of interest. Since an alternative trading system does not trade with
its customers, the trading system cannot exploit its informational advantage to the detri-
ment of its customers. Klock, supra note 74, at 760; Macey & O'Hara, supra note 155, at
45. Of course, it is conceivable that the trading system or its employees could leak confi-
dential information about trading to other market participants. As a result, the Commis-
sion adopted a requirement as part of Regulation ATS that alternative trading systems
not divulge confidential customer trading information. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(10) (2004).
174. Historically, this was done by leaving an order with a floor broker, who could
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their priority rules to respond to growing competition from mar-
ket makers in the over-the-counter market. 115 These modifications
allow exchange members to cross or internalize customer orders
expeditiously with the imprimatur of the exchange.'76
b. Regulating Members' Informational Advantages
The Exchange Act contains certain provisions designed to en-
sure that exchange members do not profit from the information
gained from their special access to the exchange floor.'77 These
provisions exist because exchanges may offer their members a
superior opportunity to observe trading conditions and to use the
information obtained from such observations to anticipate and in-
fluence market movements. 78 For example, the Exchange Act
prohibits members who engage in public business'79 from execut-
ing a member's order ahead of any public investor's order, unless
certain steps are taken to eliminate certain informational advan-
'work" the order in pieces without signaling the investor's trading interest to other par-
ticipants. Today, trading venues have developed various technological tools to accomplish
the same task. Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 169, at 1451-53 (2004).
175. Consistent with their best execution obligations, market makers must at a mini-
mum ensure that their customers' market orders are executed at the publicly quoted price.
It has been suggested that market makers should either be required to improve upon a
quoting market's public quote or route the customer's order to the quoting market, on the
theory that (i) a customer order might receive a price better than the exchange's quote if
the order were sent to the quoting market and (ii) as between an execution on a primary
exchange and in the over-the-counter market, it is preferable to execute the order against
the exchange's quote to encourage placement of public limit orders to the primary ex-
change. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to
Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,584
(Feb. 28, 2000). Some market makers have adopted such policies. See, e.g., MADOFF'S
GUIDE TO BEST EXECUTION, at http://www.madoff.com/dis/display.asp (last visited Mar. 26,
2005) (providing automatic price improvement for many retail orders executable at cur-
rent market prices).
176. It has been alleged, however, that these modifications appear to be motivated by
the desire to inflate exchange volume by "printing" pre-arranged transactions. See Pro-
posed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,171.
177. The SEGREGATION REPORT suggests that these prohibitions were intended to re-
duce market volatility by preventing members from engaging in excessive trading activity
for their own accounts, as well as to eliminate members' cost advantage resulting from the
exchange's fixed commission schedule and capital requirements. SEGREGATION REPORT,
supra note 35, at 15-17.
178. Id.
179. This excludes market makers, odd-lot dealers, arbitrageurs, and transactions
where a member is acting as an underwriter to stabilize market prices under the terms
permitted in section 11(a) of the Exchange Act.
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tages.180 The relevance of such prohibitions has declined as tech-
nology has eliminated the informational advantages of members
and as exchanges have allowed members to trade in the over-the-
counter market where no such prohibitions exist.
181
The regulation of exchange specialists poses more significant
problems, since the conduct of specialists is routinely cited as one
of the most egregious abuses of exchange market power.182 Ex-
changes have historically enhanced liquidity and reduced volatil-
ity by engaging certain market intermediaries-such as special-
ists or market makers-to deal in certain securities through their
facilities.'83 Specialists (acting as agents) represent market and
limit orders submitted by other members to them while simulta-
neously trading with customers and other participants (acting as
a dealer) as necessary to maintain "a fair and orderly mar-
ket[ ].",,' In U.S. markets, specialists and other such intermediar-
ies may be compensated by fees for handling certain orders as
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(1)(G)(ii) (2000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.111-1(T)(a)(3), 240.11a2-
2(T)). These provisions have been described as a "back stop" to deter institutional inves-
tors or their affiliates from becoming exchange members. See Celebrating Thirty Years of
Market Regulation, supra note 51, at 310; see also Exchange Act Release No. 9716, 42 Fed.
Reg. 31,810 (Aug. 3, 1972) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing Rule 19c-2, restricting
utilization of exchange membership for other than public purposes).
181. See infra note 268 (abolishing off-board trading restrictions). For example, the
Commission has granted relief from the provisions of Exchange Act section 11(a) for mem-
bers accessing an exchange electronically, to the extent that members and nonmembers
have equal access to the information contained in the exchange's electronic trading sys-
tems. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Options Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, (Mar. 31,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/cboe033103.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (noting that electronic submissions satisfy Rule lla2-2(T));
Large Order Utility System, SEC No-Action Letter, (Mar. 12, 2003), available at
http://sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/lou03l203.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005)
(noting that electronic submissions satisfy Rule 11a2-2fT)); Proposal to Allow Broker-
Dealer Orders Eligible for Automatic Execution Through the Amex Auto-Ex System, SEC
No-Action letter, (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.sec.sov/divisions/marketregmr-
noactionibdase070902.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). More of the detailed information
about market conditions that exchange members possess is currently available to the pub-
lic as well. Regulation of Market Information Release, supra note 80, at 70,613-23 (de-
scribing various means of obtaining market information and relevant regulations).
182. See, e.g., 2004 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 10-11.
183. See, e.g., id. at 106-16 (prepared statement of Frank G. Sullivan, CEO, RPM In-
ternational, Inc.) (describing benefits of NYSE specialist intermediation, particularly in
the event of significant imbalances in buying and selling interest at the opening of trad-
ing).
184. Id. at 111.
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well as profits on the spread between the prices at which they
purchase and sell securities (the "bid-ask spread").185
This dual role creates a significant conflict of interest, in that
the specialist has the discretion to intervene in the direct interac-
tion of public orders when it is not to the advantage of the ex-
change's customer.1 16 Many exchange floor trading scandals in-
volve situations in which a specialist is believed to have profited
from unnecessary interventions in exchange trading."17 Recent
examples include specialists who trade ahead of customer orders
at a negligibly superior price ("trading ahead"),"88 who "interpose"
themselves between two orders that might otherwise meet within
a reasonable period of time, or who "freeze" automatic execution
systems to prevent electronically routed order flow from interact-
ing with orders represented on the floor. 89
What distinguishes specialists from larger over-the-counter
market makers, who increasingly perform similar services for the
same compensation, is perhaps an expectation that specialists are
subject to more stringent obligations with respect to their trading
activity due to their monopoly position on the exchange. 190 In par-
185. Id. at 106-16.
186. SEGREGATION REPORT, supra note 35, at 25-31, 41-42.
187. In re SIG Specialists, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,076 (July 26, 2004), avail-
able at 2004 SEC LEXIS 1563; Performance Specialist Group LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 50,075 (July 26, 2004), available at 2004 SEC LEXIS 1564 (calculating fines based on
profits from interpositioning and lost execution opportunities due to "trading ahead" or
unexecuted limit orders).
188. The minimum price increment on the stock exchanges is currently $0.01. Thus, for
example, if an institutional customer wishes to purchase 100,000 shares of XYZ stock at
$10 for $1 million, the specialist could trade ahead of that customer by placing a bid at
$10.01, which would be an additional cost of $1,000, and executing the order before the
institution has a chance to respond. The specialist benefits from the institution's valuation
of XYZ stock without executing the institution's order. See Special Study, supra note 17,
pt. 2, at 144.
Some alternative trading systems permit, and NASDAQ has recently proposed to allow,
trading in fractions of a penny. The Commission has suggested, however, that subpenny
trading is largely employed to trade ahead of other customers and accordingly has pro-
posed to ban the practice. See Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,163.
189. For example, if customer A submits an order to buy XYZ at $10.10 per share at
12:05:00 p.m., and customer B submits an order to sell at $10.00 per share at 12:06:00
p.m., the specialist could sell XYZ to customer A at 12:05:20 p.m. and buy from customer B
at 12:06:20 p.m., making a profit of $0.10 per share. Alternatively, the specialist could
hold customer A's order in the expectation that an order to sell might be forthcoming, in
which case the $0.10 differential would go either to customer A or B.
190. Although some exchanges continue to maintain competing specialists, there are no
competing specialists on the NYSE as discussed supra note 17.
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ticular, the Commission has recognized that customers who sub-
mit a limit order effectively give the exchange specialist or mar-
ket-maker a "free option" to either execute the order or advertise
the order to the market.'91 There may be a greater expectation
that a specialist will execute such an order for its own account
when there is no trading interest on the opposite side of the mar-
ket to minimize this implicit cost of submitting limit orders. 192
Establishing a distinction between specialists and other liquid-
ity providers by law or regulation has proven to be an exceedingly
difficult task.193 While the Commission has considered segregat-
ing the brokerage and dealing functions of specialists by law, 194
exchanges have maintained that the combination of an auction
market and a specialist to regulate order flow produces a system
that provides the best price available for listed securities. 95 Ac-
cordingly, the Commission has attempted to define-or to require
exchanges to define-the circumstances in which specialists
should be required to deal ("affirmative obligations") and should
be required not to deal ("negative obligations") in compliance with
the statutory requirement that specialists should trade as rea-
sonably "necessary. . . to maintain fair and orderly markets." 96
191. A customer submitting a public limit order writes a "free option" to the extent that
the customer is committing itself to trade at a particular price, e.g., $10 to sell 1000 shares
until the order is canceled, regardless of whether the market suddenly changes direction.
Thus, if the specialist believes the value of XYZ will decrease, the specialist may ignore
the limit order and sell for its own account to other customers at a lower price, e.g., $9.95.
If the specialist believes the price of XYZ will increase, the specialist may execute the cus-
tomer's order by buying the customer's 1000 shares for its own account and subsequently
reselling them at a higher price.
192. Some trading systems have developed schemes to "reward" this free option by pay-
ing a "liquidity" rebate to customers placing limit orders. See Proposed Regulation NMS,
supra note 5, at 11,168-69.
193. Oesterle et al., supra note 8, at 226; Joel Seligman, The Future of the National
Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 139 (1984).
194. SEGREGATION REPORT, supra note 35, at 11,109-40.
195. 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 15 (testimony of John Reed, acting CEO of
the NYSE); MARKET STRUCTURE REPORT, supra note 123, at 20; Landon Thomas, Jr., Big
Board Chief Defends Trading System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at C10.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (2000). In 1937, the Division of Trading and Exchanges inter-
preted the statutory qualification to mean transactions that enhance price continuity and
minimize the effects of imbalances between supply and demand. Exchange Act Release
No. 1117, 1937 WL 31449 (Mar. 30, 1937). In 1964, the Commission adopted Rule llb-1
setting forth various areas in which exchanges were required to adopt rules for specialists,
including net capital requirements and "affirmative" and "negative" trading obligations.
17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1(a)(2)(ii); see NYSE Rule 104 (implementing the standards articu-
lated in the Saperstein interpretation). Section 11(b) was amended in 1975 to eliminate
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It is difficult to apply such affirmative and negative obligations
in practice. With respect to for-profit entities, it is unreasonable
to expect specialists to court insolvency by absorbing investor or-
ders at a loss when affirmatively required without being able to
liquidate them for a profit when trading is unnecessary.1 97 Regu-
lators and commentators thus focus on whether exchange special-
ists derive unreasonable profits from their privileged position in
the exchange.19 Exchanges, in turn, have developed quantitative
tests to assess the performance of their specialists. Given the
handful of specialist firms that handle all specialist activity on
the NYSE, it may be difficult to restrict specialist activities with-
out further reducing the number of specialist firms.199 Thus, un-
derperformance appears to be addressed primarily in the alloca-
tion of new stocks, or more infrequently, reallocation of existing
stocks, rather than fines or other disciplinary action.2"'
the express requirement that Commission rules restrict an exchange specialist's dealings
when not "reasonably necessary to permit him to maintain a fair and orderly market." See
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 110-111 (1975). Al-
though the amendment was intended to "provide the SEC with greater flexibility in pre-
scribing a specialist's obligations in a national market system," the "negative obligation"
remains in Commission Rule llb-1 and exchange rules. 1975 Amendments Legislative
History, supra note 46, at 100.
197. See Maureen O'Hara, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY 25-29 (1995); Harris,
supra note 12, at 8 ("Efforts to compel dealers to offer more liquidity must somehow in-
crease their profits or lower their perceived risk. Otherwise the dealers will simply quit.").
198. 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 236-37 (draft report of Brian Becker) (find-
ing that specialist firms earned pre-tax profits of thirty-five percent to sixty percent in
contrast to the 9.7% return enjoyed by market making firms, with respect to stocks in
various industry classifications). In the recent enforcement actions against two specialist
firms, there was some disagreement among regulators and the specialists under investiga-
tion as to the manner in which the fines were calculated, notably with respect to the time
frames used to determine whether specialist intervention was appropriate. See Landon
Thomas, Jr., S.E.C. Steps In as Fines Are Planned on 5 Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003,
at C1 (noting that the NYSE increased the size of the fines assessed for improper special-
ist intervention after "'narrow[ing] the time frame [for determining the backlog of execu-
table customer orders from sixty seconds to ten seconds] pursuant to discussions with the
S.E.C.,'" and thus determining that "more customer orders were in a backlog when the
questionable trading occurred").
199. 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 232-33 (draft presentation of Brian Becker)
(noting that seven specialist firms make markets in approximately 2557 listed securities,
of which LaBranche & Co. LLC, Spear Leeds & Kellogg Specialists, and Fleet Specialist,
Inc, together account for approximately seventy percent of share and dollar volume); Tho-
mas, supra note 195, at C10 (noting concern that there are only seven specialist firms left).
200. NYSE Rule 103A (reallocation proceedings for specialty stocks); see Oesterle et al.,
supra note 8, at 267-82. The Commission has also developed its own metrics for assessing
execution quality across markets generally. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-5 (2004).
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It would seem that the only effective constraints on specialist
activities are those created by exchanges' commercial and reputa-
tional interests. In response to competitive pressures and techno-
logical opportunities, some specialists on competing markets have
developed algorithms to perform their market-making task more
efficiently." 1 As more trading systems offer investors the alterna-
tive of a "pure" auction in listed securities, exchanges may de-
velop further restrictions on specialist conduct, or replace them
with purely automated trading systems, to retain primacy as
price discovery markets. °2 Given that exchanges must rely on so-
phisticated institutional order flow to assure the integrity of their
price-setting function, it is not unreasonable to assume that ex-
changes will increasingly face commercial pressure to address
perceived abuses of specialist power as other venues attract li-
quidity in listed securities.
c. Coordinating Intermarket Regulation
Perhaps the weakest area for relying upon self-regulation is
the oversight of trading activity by members and nonmembers.
For example, exchanges are called upon to determine whether
unusual imbalances in trading activity or the dissemination of
rumors or recent news require temporary halts in trading. Ex-
changes are also required to monitor trading in their markets for
possible manipulative activity or insider trading. Such regulation
historically was premised upon the concentration of liquidity in
publicly traded securities on a single exchange or market.
In some cases, an exchange that has entered into a listing
agreement with a public company might be the appropriate mar-
ket participant to take the lead in coordinating intermarket ac-
tion.20 3 As the regulatory authority responsible for monitoring an
issuer's compliance with corporate governance standards and fed-
201. See, e.g., Automated Trading Desk, at http://www.atdesk.com/strategy.html (last
visited Mar. 26, 2005) (describing Automated Trading Desk's combination with a specialist
firm on the Chicago Stock Exchange).
202. Landon Thomas, Jr., Electronic Trading on Big Board Upstages Alert, N.Y. TIMES
Aug. 3, 2004, at C1 (unveiling extensions to NYSE's existing NYSE Direct+ electronic
trading system to accommodate institutional trading).
203. But see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 61
(1988) (recommending a single intermarket agency for trading halts and circuit breaker
mechanisms, among other market functions).
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eral securities law, an exchange may initiate a dialogue with the
issuer to recommend action to quell or confirm rumors or disclose
additional information to the marketplace to restore market sta-
bility.2 4 There is a significant commonality of interest between
markets and issuers in maintaining orderly trading activity that
delegating this task to a primary market seems reasonable.
Trading practices that are designed to elude regulatory over-
sight-illegal short selling, insider trading, and market manipu-
lation-may benefit more from a uniform order audit trail sys-
tem, maintained by a single regulator.2 5 Such activity may be
designed to take place across multiple markets in order to escape
the notice of the primary exchange, or may exploit differences in
trading rules applicable in different markets.2 6 For listed securi-
ties, monitoring for manipulative or insider trading activity today
entails coordinating the audit trails and enforcement efforts of
multiple SROs.2 °7 Because the types of information captured un-
204. See, e.g., NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 202.01 to 202.06 (1992) [here-
inafter LCM], available at http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm-section.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2005).
205. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1499. For example, the Commission's efforts to prose-
cute recent specialist trading scandals relied heavily on the NYSE's detailed order audit
trail to determine whether specialists improperly intervened in trading. See supra note
198 and accompanying text.
206. For example, after years of differential standards in the listed and over-the-
counter markets for short selling in listed securities, the SEC recently proposed revisions
to its short sale rule to promote greater consistency. Short Sales, Exchange Act Release
No. 50,103, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008 (Aug. 6, 2004) (adopting final rule instituting a new uni-
form bid test allowing short sales to be effected at a price one cent above the consolidated
best bid with respect to all exchange-listed securities and NASDAQ National Market Sys-
tem Securities, wherever traded).
207. Market surveillance in the listed securities market is coordinated by the Inter-
market Surveillance Group, whose members include all registered U.S. stock and options
exchanges, the NASD, and several major futures exchanges. Prior to 1988, the Commis-
sion and the ISG members collected information about suspicious trading activity from
broker-dealers through the use of "blue sheet" questionnaires, later replaced by an "elec-
tronic blue sheet" ("EBS") system. See Electronic Submission of Securities Transaction In-
formation by Exchange Members, Brokers, and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 44,494,
66 Fed. Reg. 35,836, 35,840 (July 9, 2001) (adopting final rule relating to electronic sub-
mission of securities transaction information). EBS inquiries are aggregated by SIAC, see
supra note 79, and forwarded to the requesting entity. Until the adoption of Rule 17a-25,
record-keeping and transmission requirements for the EBS system were established by
individual SRO rules. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 410A; AMEX Rule 153A; NASD Rule 8211.
The EBS system does not collect information about the handling of customer orders; as a
result, the maintenance of adequate order audit trails is governed by individual SRO
rules. In the NASDAQ Stock Market, broker-dealers trading in NASDAQ securities are
required to maintain an audit trail under the NASD's Order Audit Trail System. NASD
Rule 6950. As unlisted trading in NASDAQ securities on exchanges increases, cracks in
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der various exchange rules are inconsistent, and because individ-
ual orders may be shuttled among numerous broker-dealers be-
fore reaching an execution facility, it is very difficult to piece to-
gether a complete sequence of order routing instructions-from
creation to execution-for an individual order in such a regime.
Thus, commentators have called on the SEC to standardize rules
across markets for surveilling for and enforcing against such
practices. 08
2. Regulating Issuer Quality
An exchange's listing standards serve various purposes. Listing
standards ensure that an exchange can sustain an expectation of
reasonable liquidity in a continuous auction environment without
undue specialist involvement.20 9 Thus, virtually all exchanges re-
quire issuers to meet certain quantitative criteria regarding the
size of the issue, the volume of shares traded, the number of pub-
lic shareholders, the aggregate market value of shares, and prof-
itability.2 0 Listing rules also include mandatory disclosure re-
quirements, corporate governance standards, and other factors
designed to identify companies whose securities are likely to gen-
erate long-term confidence and thus sustainable trading interest
by the public.211
the NASDAQ audit trail can be expected to become more and more problematic. See, e.g.,
SECURITY TRADERS ASSOCIATION, FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF THE NATIONAL MARKET
SYSTEM: STA's PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. MARKET STRUCTURE, app. A, 10-11 (Aug. 2003)
[hereinafter STA REPORT], available at http://www.securitytraders.org/STA%20White%20
Paper%20Final%207-03.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
Moreover, the primary exchanges generally remain responsible for detecting anomalous
order routing or trading activity, which may then lead to a request for submission of elec-
tronic order routing or transaction data by broker-dealers or consultation with the issuer.
See, e.g., LCM, supra note 204, § 202.04. As trading fragments across multiple markets, it
will become increasingly difficult for SROs to detect the type of activity warranting further
investigation without a central market surveillance system.
208. STA REPORT, supra note 207, at 7-8.
209. Macey & Kanda, supra note 12, at 1025-34; see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
210. Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 2, at 828; see, e.g., LCM, supra note 207, § 102;
NASD Rule 4310 (NASDAQ Stock Market criteria); NASD Rule 4420 (NASDAQ National
Market criteria).
211. See Michael, supra note 44, at 1477. There may be good reason to subject other
products, e.g., stock index funds and derivative contracts, to some heightened degree of
regulation in light of the particular function exchanges play in standardizing those con-
tracts. Since the rights and privileges of securities are defined by state law, and since all
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From the issuer's perspective, the listing contract serves
largely as a method of attracting broad retail interest in, and thus
conditioning a favorable market for subsequent issues of, its eq-
uity and debt securities. Shareholders of listed companies have
access to the exchange's trading facilities and a commitment to
liquidity,212 as well as access to current information about trading
activity in their listed companies.213 Despite the emergence of rat-
ing agencies and other groups that perform a similar evaluation
function with respect to publicly traded securities, exchange
monitoring of an issuer's corporate governance standards is still
generally considered vital to promoting investor confidence.214
Moreover, listing on the NYSE, the AMEX, or NASDAQ is gener-
ally necessary to claim an exemption from state blue sky registra-
tion and to permit securities to be purchased on margin.215
As public attention periodically focuses on corporate wrongdo-
ing, Congress and the Commission have put greater pressure on
exchanges to raise listing standards, rather than federalize such
standards for all registered public companies or to establish tiers
of federal regulation.216 Particularly in light of the limitations on
Commission authority pronounced in Business Roundtable v.
SEC,"7 the Commission has pressured exchanges to adopt stan-
dards for a range of issues to supplement state corporation law.21 '
More recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress re-
quired the Commission to adopt rules requiring that exchange
contracts for the sale of stock are largely fungible as a result of the centralization of the
clearance and settlement process, these considerations should not effect the development
of exchange listing rules.
212. See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 169, at 1426-33 (noting the impact of ex-
change listing or switching of listings on stock value).
213. Even nontraditional markets have sought to create listing arrangements with
public companies by offering special analytical products. See, e.g., Archipelago, Listing on
ArcaEx, http://www.tradearca.comlissuers/listing.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
214. But see Macey & O'Hara, supra note 155, at 40 (noting the declining value of the
listing function).
215. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2 (2004) (defining margin security to include any security regis-
tered or having unlisted trading privileges on a national securities exchange or any secu-
rity listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market); see supra note 21.
216. Michael, supra note 44, at 1476-77 (describing the Commission's efforts to develop
corporate governance listing standards in the 1950s and 1970s); Poser, supra note 72, at
957-58 (describing the Commission's failed efforts to establish quantitative standards for
national market system securities).
217. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
218. These include dual-class recapitalizations, expensing of stock options, composition
and authority of audit committees and other independent board committees, executive
compensation, and other matters historically left to state law. Id. at 409-10.
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and NASDAQ-listed companies comply with certain heightened
corporate governance standards.219
Listing is, however, a contractual relationship. While the Ex-
change Act requires registration of issuers of publicly traded se-
curities, it does not require listing of publicly traded securities.
Issuers are free not to seek listing of their securities on any ex-
change, and as discussed below, are generally free to delist or
relist their securities on another exchange. Moreover, an ex-
change listing is not required for investors to trade a particular
issue on an exchange, if the exchange is able to trade the security
on an unlisted basis.22° For many public issuers, the benefits of
listing on the NYSE, the AMEX, or NASDAQ far outweigh the
regulatory burdens, and accordingly issuers have tolerated-and
in many cases embraced-such heightened regulation as the price
of encouraging investor confidence.22'
If exchanges have been successful at imposing listing stan-
dards, it is far less certain that they have been able to enforce
those standards or to take appropriate remedial action. Because
the listing relationship is contractual, the only practical remedy
for violation of exchange rules is the stigma of reprimand or de-
listing. Given the increasing competition for listings, it is unclear
whether exchanges are willing to absorb the reputational loss of
fewer listings or trades or the financial losses due to declining in
listing, trading, and market data fees resulting from delistings.222
The Commission's efforts to facilitate "voluntary" delisting of pub-
lic companies further removes an exchange's leverage to enforce
their listing standards by allowing issuers to avoid the stigma of
an exchange reprimand or other sanction.223
219. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2004); Standards Relating to Listing Company Audit
Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003).
220. See supra notes 209-11.
221. Approximately 13,500 registered public companies submitted reports to the Com-
mission in fiscal year 2002. By comparison, the Commission reported that, as of December
31, 2002, there were 2102 issues of common stock listed on the NYSE and 657 issues of
common stock listed on the AMEX. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT 139 (2003) [hereinafter SEC
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep03.shtml (last visited Mar.
26, 2005). NASDAQ reported that there were approximately 3600 issues listed for trading
on its facilities. NASDAQ, ANNUAL REPORT 2002.
222. See supra note 140 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
223. See infra note 291-92 and accompanying text (voluntary delisting).
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3. Regulating Member Business Conduct
The Exchange Act requires national securities exchanges and
associations to supervise their member firms with respect to a
wide range of matters apart from their trading activities on an
exchange or in the over-the-counter market. Exchanges histori-
cally have behaved very much like professional associations for
broker-dealers, and professional associations have traditionally
been granted enormous deference by legislators in drafting indus-
try codes of conduct and disciplining their membership.224 As de-
scribed above, the NASD was similarly designed to serve as a pro-
fessional association for broker-dealers not a member of an
exchange.225
While there is no statutory obstacle to the formation of multi-
ple SROs for the purpose of setting or enforcing standards of con-
duct, no new SROs appear to have been created for this express
purpose, other than those established by Congress for specific
segments of the securities market. As broker-dealers are limited
in their choice of designated examining authority and the bundle
of business conduct rules applicable to their public activities, it
can be expected that exchanges and the NASD have significantly
more leverage to oversee and discipline their members than their
listed issuers.226
a. Setting Standards of Conduct
One important function performed by the exchanges and the
NASD is to establish rules for the regulation of broker-dealers' re-
lationship with their public customers.22 The Exchange Act re-
quires exchanges and the NASD to adopt rules designed, among
other things, "to promote just and equitable principles of trade"
and "to protect investors and the public interest."22 The ex-
224. See David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 442-44 (2003).
225. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
226. Of course, in light of the relatively small number of NYSE specialists, see supra
note 199, it may become increasingly difficult for the NYSE to threaten them with disci-
plinary sanctions.
227. Such rules include a variety of matters, such as financial responsibility, fraud or
manipulation, record keeping, reporting, sales practices for, advertising of, or standards of
training, experience, competence, or other qualifications.
228. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (2000).
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changes and the NASD have adopted rules relating to such mat-
ters as qualification examinations, registration and training of
broker-dealer personnel,229 written supervisory procedures,23 °
sales practices and advertising,231 suitability of recommenda-
tions,232 best execution standards,233 customer margins,234 confir-
mations and account statements, 235 and discretionary trading au-
thority.236 The exchanges and the NASD have also supplemented
the Commission's prophylactic rules relating to financial respon-
sibility and record keeping with additional rules and guidance.237
It is debatable whether there is a need for multiple SROs to
develop standards for regulating members' public business. To
the extent that many broker-dealers are members of multiple ex-
changes, such regulation can be redundant and at worst inconsis-
tent.238 On the other hand, there are good reasons for retaining or
encouraging the organization of multiple SROs, at least in the-
ory.239 Not all broker-dealers have similar business models. To the
extent that SRO governance may suffer from tyranny of the ma-
jority, it may well be desirable to allow subsets of broker-dealers
the option of creating different business conduct rules.240 Fur-
thermore, it may be desirable to encourage broker-dealers to dif-
ferentiate themselves based on quality of service or professional
229. NASD Rules 1020-1070; NYSE Rules 304A, 345, 345A.
230. NASD Rule 3010; NYSE Rules 342, 354.
231. NASD Rule 2210.
232. NASD Rule 2310; NYSE Rule 405 (the "know-your-customer" rule).
233. NASD Rule 2320.
234. NASD Rule 2520; NYSE Rule 431.
235. NASD Rule 2340; NYSE Rule 409.
236. NASD Rule 2510; NYSE Rule 408.
237. See generally LCM, supra note 204, § 301.00 to 315.00.
238. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: COMPETITION AND
MULTIPLE REGULATORS HEIGHTEN CONCERNS ABOUT SELF-REGULATION 2 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gaoreports/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). For
several decades, proposals have been made to create or designate a single regulatory au-
thority to promulgate business conduct rules, as is the case in the government and mu-
nicipal securities markets. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78o-5 (2000) (granting rule making author-
ity for participants in the municipal and U.S. government securities markets to the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and the U.S. Treasury respectively).
239. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1457-59. The Maloney Act anticipated that multiple
national securities associations could develop, subject to the requirement that they be
drawn from a broad geographic base. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
240. Kahan, supra note 131, at 1516-17. The Commission has acknowledged, for ex-
ample, that alternative trading systems are free to form their own self-regulatory organi-
zation if they believe that regulation by existing SROs is prone to conflicts of interest.
Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,863.
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standards.24' For example, with respect to the carrying and clear-
ing of customer accounts, the NYSE regulatory staff has histori-
cally imposed high standards of financial responsibility242 and is
often at the forefront of developing stringent financial responsi-
bility requirements that are later incorporated into industry-wide
rules .243
There are also elements of member regulation that are directly
affected by, or related to, market conditions such that they are an
essential element of exchange operations. The ability to adjust
capital requirements for members of an exchange or margin re-
quirements for members' customers has traditionally been an im-
portant component of exchanges' regulatory power insofar as re-
laxation or tightening of standards or relief in individual cases
may be necessary to avoid adverse consequences for a market-
place.2 44 Rules regarding the aggregation of short positions and
customer debit and credit balances might provide markets with
information about future demands on liquidity.245 Changes in
trading patterns on individual markets may also prompt changes
in exchange rules, policies, and practices.
b. Enforcing Securities Laws and SRO Rules
Two self-regulatory organizations, the NYSE and the NASD,
predominate enforcement of securities laws and SRO rules.246 The
Commission has authorized the securities exchanges and the
NASD to allocate regulatory responsibility for monitoring and en-
241. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 224, at 442-44.
242. Karmel, supra note 21, at 355; Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1461 (detailing the ac-
tions of the NYSE).
243. See Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 75-79.
244. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures
Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 99-111, 117-24, 130-32 (1991) (dis-
cussing the stock exchanges' use of discretionary authority to raise or lower margin re-
quirements during adverse market conditions, and the argument for exchange control over
margins as a self-protective measure). For example, the SRO serving as a broker-dealer's
designated examining authority has the discretion to grant extensions for compliance with
customer margin calls or payment for cash transactions under the rules of the Federal Re-
serve Board and the SEC. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.4(c)(3)(ii), 220.8(d) (2004); SEC Rule 15c3-3(n);
see NYSE Rule 434.
245. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 421.
246. The NYSE is the designated examining authority for approximately 280 of its
member firms. The NASD regulates approximately 5100 firms. NASD, About NASD, at
http://www.nasd.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
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forcing compliance with federal securities laws and SRO rules.247
The Commission also assigns each broker-dealer that conducts
public business a "designated examining authority" to monitor
compliance with applicable financial responsibility rules.24 ' The
NYSE and the NASD have entered into contractual arrange-
ments with other national securities exchanges for regulation of
their dual members with respect to enforcement of their business
conduct rules and self-regulatory responsibilities other than the
operation of their markets.249
As described above, self-regulatory enforcement of business
conduct rules is thought to be preferable to SEC enforcement be-
cause self-regulatory organizations are thought to be better able
to adopt and enforce ethical norms of business conduct with re-
spect to their members than a government agency. Industry
members may often be the best judge of the appropriate penalties
for business practices that may be unethical, but not fraudu-
lent. 2 0 Likewise, the ability to distinguish "technical" violations
from "serious" violations or to assess an individual firm's "com-
mitment" to robust compliance programs when weighing en-
forcement options are said to involve value judgments that cannot
be effectively codified into a regulation or enforced through a ju-
dicial proceeding.25'
The concerns raised by conferring regulatory responsibility to
individual exchanges in enforcing business conduct standards
and the federal securities laws are apparent. First, there is a per-
247. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(d) (2000).
248. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17d-1 (2004).
249. The NYSE and the NASD have done so pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 240.17d-2. See Re-
quest for Comments, supra note 93, at 30,519 n.211 (listing the existing agreements under
Exchange Act Rule 17d-2 between various exchanges, the NYSE, and the NASD).
250. One example of this is the NASD's rule against excessive markups on securities in
dealer transactions. NASD Rule 2440; NASD IM-2440. The SEC has tried to establish
through judicial and administrative proceedings the threshold beyond which a mark-up is
"fraudulent." See, e.g., SEC, SEC Settles Yield Burning Case Against Dain Rauscher, Inc.,
Litigation Release No. 16,505 (Apr. 6, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litre
leases/lrl6505.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). The NASD rule, by contrast, acknowledges
that "no interpretation" of what is a "fair" price or commission "can be all-inclusive for the
obvious reason that what might be considered fair in one transaction could be unfair in
another transaction because of different circumstances," such as the prevailing market for
the security, the type of security required, or the effort expended by the broker-dealer in
acquiring the security. NASD IM-2440(a).
251. Kip Betz, NYSE's Ketchum Calls for Review, Not Replacement of Self-Regulatory
Model, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 12, 2004).
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ception that exchanges may not have an incentive to reform rules
having a significant impact on the most influential members, or
to impose meaningful sanctions on firms in violation of those
rules or the federal securities laws.252 There is also a perceived
threat that exchanges may use their disciplinary authority to fur-
ther the commercial interests of the exchange, rather than the in-
terests of the public.253 As a result, there are periodic allegations
that the NYSE, and to a lesser extent the NASD, fail to carry out
their enforcement responsibilities as rigorously as possible.254
This partly reflects the SEC's limited ability to require ex-
changes and other SROs to live up to their statutory responsibil-
ity to enforce federal securities laws and SRO rules in an even-
handed manner. It is unclear what significant steps the SEC can
take against a SRO for failing to comply with its regulatory du-
ties without disrupting the securities marketplace, apart from as-
sessing fines and seeking prospective injunctive relief to modify
exchange governance.2 5 As a result, many enforcement actions
proceed against broker-dealers directly for violations of federal
252. For example, it has been suggested that the NYSE is more inclined to seek reme-
dial measures--e.g., consultants and independent directors-than to impose punitive fines
on its members. A Primer on the Regulation of U.S. Stock Markets, at http://pages.stern.
nyu.edu/-adamodar/NewHomefPage/articles/whoregulates.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2005).
253. For example, it has been alleged that primary exchanges might question the qual-
ity of executions in listed securities effected off the exchange. See 2003 House Hearings,
supra note 1, at 42 (testimony of Gerald Putnam, CEO, Archipelago); Lipton, supra note
125, at 557 (noting that the NYSE and the AMEX oppose a best execution rule because
they benefit from the order flow). As another example, some have questioned the propriety
of the NASD's practice of depositing fines assessed in a general regulatory fund that is
used, among other things, to pay regulatory officials. Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE
Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street Regulate Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at
Al; see also supra note 197 (pressuring specialists to provide more liquidity to certain
firms).
254. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Big Board Is Far From Forefront When It Comes to
Policing, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 2003, at C1. Following the market maker scandal of 1995,
the NASD was enjoined to separate its regulatory operations and market operations into
two segregated subsidiaries, NASD Regulation, Inc. and the NASDAQ Stock Market. See
NASDAQ 21(A) REPORT, supra note 94, at 50-54.
255. Deregistration of an exchange is a rare event. See Karessa Cain, New Efforts to
Strengthen Corporate Governance: Why Use SRO Listing Standards?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 619, 652-58 (2003). Sections 19(g) and (h) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)-(h)
(2000), added as a result of 1975 Amendments, grant the SEC authority to take more tar-
geted action with respect to self-regulatory organizations and their associated persons-
e.g., suspension of registration, censure, or limitation on the activities, functions, and op-
erations. While the SEC has exercised this authority to limit certain types of trading-e.g.,
a moratorium on multiple listing of options contracts-it would be difficult to suspend
trading on a major market for a significant period of time.
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securities law, including unethical behavior deemed to violate the
antifraud provisions thereof.
2 5 6
It is also difficult to determine whether exchange, or even a
wholly independent SRO, could effectively discipline members
even if management were aggressively willing to root out prob-
lems. Because the SRO relationship is contractual, SROs lack the
law enforcement tools possessed by government regulators 257 and
the sanctions available to SROs are limited-reprimand, imposi-
tion of fines, limitations on activities,258 and expulsion or suspen-
sion from membership. 259 To the extent that SROs are represen-
tative of the industry, moreover, there will always be concern that
the conduct of larger firms with greater trading volumes or
greater influence over SRO governance, or systemic practices
prevalent throughout the industry, will go unnoticed.26 °
256. See, e.g., In re SIG Specialists, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,076 (July 26,
2004), available at 2004 SEC LEXIS 1563; In re Performance Specialist Group LLC, Ex-
change Act Release No. 50,075 (July 26, 2004), available at 2004 SEC LEXIS 1564 (hold-
ing NYSE specialist firms liable under Rule 10b-5 for violating their implied representa-
tions to public customers that they were limiting dealer transactions to those reasonably
necessary to maintain a fair and orderly market as required by SEC and NYSE rules). The
SEC has long devoted a significant portion of its own resources to monitoring and enforc-
ing compliance by broker-dealers with federal securities laws, often in cooperation with
the NYSE and the NASD. See SEC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 221, at 68, 72-74 (stating
that Commission staff inspected 626 broker-dealers and noted deficiencies in areas such
as record keeping, net capital computation, suitability, inadequate supervisory proce-
dures); id. at 9-10 (noting significant enforcement cases against broker-dealers).
In such proceedings, the Commission has employed the "shingle theory" of broker-dealer
antifraud liability to establish minimum standards of business conduct in areas such as
churning of customer accounts and excessive commissions and markups, as well as tradi-
tional securities fraud. Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Single Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1271 (1995).
257. The SEC recently approved a NASD rule change permitting it to issue temporary
cease-and-desist orders on a two-year pilot basis in June 2003. Exchange Act Release No.
47,925, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,548 (June 4, 2003) (granting approval to proposed rule change).
258. The NYSE's regulatory arm is, according to a recent report, comprehensively re-
viewing its current penalty structure to tackle the problem of recidivist conduct-
principally by replacing monetary fines with suspension of lines of business. Kip Betz,
New York Stock Exchange: Comprehensive Penalty Review Underway at NYSE Regulation,
Official Says, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 3, 2004).
259. Kahan, supra note 131, at 1517. Some have suggested that the appropriate re-
sponse is to give self-regulatory authorities greater powers to investigate and discipline
their members. Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, 26 REGU-
LATION 32, 39 (2003).
260. Indeed, the Commission has been faulted for failing to target abuses by larger
firms during periods that its enforcement resources have been strapped. 2003 House Hear-
ings, supra note 1, pt. 2, at 31 (noting the SEC's failure to detect practices with respect to
research analysts and mutual funds discovered by the New York Attorney General's of-
fice); SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 268-69.
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Other attempts at enforcement are equally problematic. Pri-
vate rights of action, while an important component of regulating
compliance with federal securities law, are not expressly author-
ized by the Exchange Act with respect to SRO rules. 21' Thus, in-
vestors cannot generally seek to enforce exchange rules against
member firms in court, or to sue an SRO for failing to follow its
own rules or to enforce rules against its members.262 Mandatory
arbitration clauses in customer agreements permitted by SRO
rules effectively preclude litigation of many customer disputes in
court. 63
III. THE EXCHANGE AS COMPETITOR
Despite the self-regulatory functions performed by securities
exchanges such as the NYSE and the AMEX, Congress and the
Commission have remained wary of allowing them to maintain a
monopoly over securities trading. Thus the 1975 Amendments re-
quire the Commission both to review exchange rules for their im-
pact on competition as well as to actively promote competition
among exchanges and over-the-counter market makers by tearing
down unnecessary barriers to competition for transactions and
listings. The Commission's efforts in this area have had signifi-
cant implications for the commercial interests of exchanges and
their members, with the result that many exchanges have ex-
plored the possibility of abandoning the "cooperative" structure
that makes self-regulation possible.
261. Courts have generally been averse to recognizing an implied private right of action
by investors against members of an exchange or the NASD solely for a violation of the
SRO's rules. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.
1966); see also 9 LOuis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4440-43 (3d ed.
2000). But see Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.
1969). Violations of an SRO rule may nevertheless be adduced to establish a private right
of action under common law or the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See
generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Private Federal Right of Action Against
Brokerage Firm for Violation of Exchange or Dealer Association Rule, 54 A.L.R. FED. 11
(1981).
262. MM&S Fin., Inc. v. NASD, 364 F.3d 908, 911 (8th Cir. 2004).
263. FSP, Inc. v. Socidt6 C6ndrale, 350 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003). See generally Gretchen
Morgenson, Why Investors May Find Arbitrators on Their Side, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001,
at C1 (suggesting arbitration may be preferable for investors to the extent that arbitrators
do not require customers to establish proof of intent to defraud in securities disputes
predicated on violations of just and equitable principles of trade).
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A. Competition for Transactions
As discussed above, exchanges faced competitive pressure from
other markets long before the adoption of the Exchange Act. His-
torically, exchanges' primary competition has been the unorgan-
ized, over-the-counter market, where intermediaries offer to exe-
cute customer orders at prices set by reference to exchange
prices-in particular, orders of uninformed and unsophisticated
retail investors. Specialists on regional exchanges and market
makers attracted such order flow by offering lower commissions,
better trading mechanisms, and other ancillary services to attract
customers from the primary exchanges.2"
The Commission has expended considerable effort to make re-
gional exchanges competitive with primary exchanges. Since
many listed issuers on regional exchanges could not meet the Ex-
change Act's initial registration requirements, Congress permit-
ted exchanges to trade unlisted securities pursuant to "unlisted
trading privileges."265 In 1941, the Commission ordered the NYSE
to "clarify" its rules to permit NYSE members to trade in NYSE-
listed securities on other exchanges, so that NYSE specialists
could make markets on regional exchanges.266 The Commission's
rules under the national market system provisions of the Ex-
change Act effectively required the NYSE and the AMEX to open
their market data distribution mechanisms to, and share the
revenue generated by the sale of market data with, regional ex-
changes to keep them competitive.
The Commission has also taken significant steps to make over-
the-counter market makers in listed securities competitive with
the primary exchanges. Most significantly, Congress and the
264. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1463. Regional exchanges and other markets have also
historically used financial incentives to attract order flow. Some such incentives-e.g.,
guaranteed price improvement-benefit customers directly; others---e.g., payments to re-
tail brokers for order flow-only benefit the customer to the extent his or her broker-dealer
passes such payments along in the form of lower commissions.
265. 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(2) (2000). Not only were issuers permitted to list securities on
multiple exchanges, but exchanges could also initiate unlisted trading in securities with-
out issuer consent, with Commission approval.
266. In re The Rules of the NYSE, 10 S.E.C. 270, 298 (1941). As a result of the Unlisted
Trading Privileges Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(1) (2000)). Commission approval of UTP trading is no longer required.
See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 169, at 1416-26 (describing the history of UTP trad-
ing privileges).
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Commission engaged in a prolonged battle with the exchanges,
and principally the NYSE, to eliminate restrictions on trading by
members in the over-the-counter market. In 1976, the Commis-
sion eliminated exchange prohibitions against off-board trading
with respect to all public companies listed thereafter.2 67 In May
2000, after significant pressure from the Commission and sub-
stantial evasion of the rule through after-hours trading, the
NYSE rescinded Rule 390, despite its protestations that the rule
was necessary to help concentrate order flow and thus promote
price discovery for its listed securities.268
While exchanges have sought to shield their price discovery
process from free riding by other market participants, it is diffi-
cult to argue that competition from the regional exchanges and
over-the-counter market makers posed a serious threat to the
primacy, if not profitability, of stock exchanges. These markets
did not attempt to engage in price discovery, but left to the pri-
mary exchanges the difficult task of managing quotes to reflect
informed buying and selling pressure.269 It is arguable that, until
the development of more efficient order transmissions systems, it
was not practicable to send smaller retail orders to an exchange
floor for execution at all.27° Indeed, it was the Commission's con-
cern about the lack of competition in the securities marketplace
that formed the basis for many of its initial efforts to shape mar-
ket structure.2
The source of competition more troubling for exchanges in re-
cent years has been the automation of trading by alternative
trading systems and subsequently by NASDAQ, which now seeks
to become an exchange. As described above, the Commission
sought to protect these systems from the self-regulatory regime
for exchanges through no-action relief in order to encourage pri-
vate sector technological innovation. To do so, the Commission is-
267. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2004); see Michael, supra note 44, at 1480-95 (describing
the history of Exchange Act Rule 19c-4).
268. Order Approving Proposed Change to Rescind Rule 390, Exchange Act Release No.
42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175 (May 5, 2000).
269. There is some evidence that cream-skimming may have a negative impact on pub-
lic spreads by discouraging submission of limit orders to the primary market. See Macey &
O'Hara, supra note 155, at 31 n.26.
270. Seligman, supra note 193, at 106 (noting that regional exchanges were most effec-
tive at competing for marketable orders by offering low-cost executions).
271. 1975 Amendments Legislative History, supra note 46, at 1; Maynard, supra note
72, at 857.
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sued an interpretation of the definition of the term "exchange" to
exclude all similarly situated systems from regulation, provided
that they were not "designed ... to centralize trading and pro-
vide ... quotations on a regular or continuous basis so that pur-
chasers and sellers have a reasonable expectation that they can
regularly execute their orders at those price quotations."272
Unlike systems that engage in derivative pricing, however,
some alternative trading systems have come to pose a more real-
istic-if as yet remote-competitive threat to the primary ex-
changes because they seek to supplant the exchanges' traditional
price discovery function.273 Such systems operate a limit order
book that offers similar opportunities for direct order interaction,
but without the ability of a specialist to intervene in trading on
discretionary terms.274 Many such systems promise to offer en-
hanced order types and order matching features at greater speed,
all of which tend to increase the probability of execution at a fa-
vorable price. Some are even willing to disseminate their order
books for free over the Internet to advertise the depth of their li-
quidity in certain securities.7 5 It is conceivable that, over time,
272. Delta Release, supra note 10, at 1895. The Commission suggested in the Delta Re-
lease that the use of a continuous auction or consolidated limit order book might create
such an expectation, while the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the Commission's order, high-
lighted the lack of a specialist or market maker providing continuous quotes as undermin-
ing the expectation of liquidity on such trading systems. As a result of the growing promi-
nence of exchanges, however, the Commission has revised its definition of an exchange.
See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Floor Show: If Big Board Specialists Are an Anachronism,
They're a Profitable One, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at Al; James P. Selway, Five Myths
About Listed Trading, 2002 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 76, available at http://institutional
investor.com/pdf/channels/13/TP_- SP_02_Selway.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). There is
nevertheless doubt as to whether trading systems will pose a challenge to the price setting
function of the NYSE. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 21, at 347-48; Gerald T. Novak, Note,
A Failure of Communication: An Argument for the Closing of the NYSE Floor, 26 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 485, 504 (1993).
274. While electronic systems cannot replicate the negotiation of floor brokers and spe-
cialists in "working" a particularly large or sensitive order, many electronic systems offer
subscribers negotiation features and enhanced order types, e.g. Instinet, at
http://www.instinet.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2005), exposure of market orders to crowd
participation, e.g. NASD's Primex, NASD Notice to Members 00-65, (Sept. 2000), at http:/l
www.nasd.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2005), or the ability to enter matrices describing their
trading interest under various market conditions, e.g. Optimark, OptiMark Holdings, Inc.
Co. Profile, at http://biz.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
275. See, e.g., Bookviewer, supra note 141. The Commission's Regulation NMS, as re-
proposed, requires public dissemination of all limit orders. See Proposed Regulation NMS,
supra note 5.
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issuers may choose to designate such markets as the primary
trading venue for their securities.276
A related potential source of competition is foreign markets. In
particular, European stock markets have undergone a series of
consolidations over the past several years, through which tradi-
tional floor-based national stock exchanges have been replaced by
a few, highly automated execution platforms.277 Unlike U.S. ex-
changes, which are limited to U.S. registered broker-dealer mem-
bers, European stock exchanges are permitted to offer remote ac-
cess to firms authorized in other jurisdictions, including the
United States."7 For several years, foreign exchanges have lob-
bied Congress and the Commission to provide U.S. broker-dealers
and investors with direct access to their trading systems.279
While the Commission has enumerated a number of options for
regulating access to foreign markets, it has resisted granting such
relief generally,280 mostly because such markets are incapable of
providing the SRO function U.S. exchanges provide without sig-
nificant disruptions to their business model.281 The unfortunate
impact of this regulatory impasse is that U.S. investors do not
have the opportunity to interact with order flow in foreign mar-
kets, except through private linkages intermediated by U.S. bro-
ker-dealers and their foreign affiliates.21 2 To the extent that U.S.
institutions and investment firms have used offshore markets to
276. See generally Macey & Kanda, supra note 12.
277. Deutsche B6rse AG and Euronext NV, the two largest stock markets in Europe by
market value, have each grown through a series of mergers with smaller European na-
tional exchanges over the past decade. Deutsche Borse AG recently confirmed the re-
opening of merger negotiations with the London Stock Exchange PLC, the third largest
European stock market. Silvia Ascarelli, A Market Marriage in Europe?, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 14, 2004, at C18.
278. See Council Directive 2004/39/EC, art. 33, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 26.
279. Nevertheless, pressure from European exchanges and regulators continues to bear
on the SEC. See Floyd Norris, U.S. and European Securities Officials Vow Cooperation,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2004, at C3. By contrast, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion has permitted foreign exchanges to provide electronic terminals to U.S. futures com-
mission merchants.
280. The SEC has exempted one non-U.S. trading system, virt-x-formerly, Tradepoint
Financial Networks-from registration as a national securities exchange, subject to vari-
ous conditions and volume restrictions. Order Granting Limited Volume Exemption From
Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act, Exchange
Act Release No. 41,199, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,953, 14,954 (Mar 29, 1999); Letter to Tradepoint
Stock Exchange/virt-x (June 21, 2001), available at 2001 WL 722110.
281. See Concept Release, supra note 6, at 71,131.
282. See Request for Comments, supra note 93, at 30,521-22.
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avoid certain trading restrictions in the United States, the inabil-
ity of retail investors to interact with such markets is not entirely
insignificant."3
Exchanges have modernized their trading facilities to deal with
the threats posed by competing trading systems.2"4 One of the ma-
jor obstacles to more substantive changes is the requirement that
the Commission approve exchange rule changes after public no-
tice and comment. 5 Exchanges have long complained that their
modernization efforts have been hampered by the public notice
and comment process, which can in some cases take several years
as Commission staff seek to address the issues raised in public
comments-often propounded by rival exchanges, trading sys-
tems and broker-dealers.286 Despite its efforts, the Commission
has yet to develop a workable scheme for exchange rule approval
that balances the need for competitive flexibility and public ac-
countability.28
7
B. Competition for Listings
As competition between exchanges and alternative trading sys-
tems increases, exchanges such as the NYSE, the AMEX, and
NASDAQ have come under significant commercial pressure to
compete with respect to their listing standards. Exchanges must
balance their reputational interest in listing only companies ex-
hibiting the potential for liquid trading and high standards of
corporate governance against the need to retain or attract addi-
tional listings. Many markets in the United States and abroad
began aggressively developing new market segments in the 1990S
283. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2004) (requiring U.S. broker-dealer intermediation
of transactions between U.S. customers and unregistered broker-dealers outside of the
United States). The significant volume of trades effected after-hours outside of the United
States to avoid the application of NYSE Rule 390 prompted the NYSE to require reporting
of offshore transactions in Rule 410-B. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
284. Request for Comments, supra note 93, at 30,516; see also NYSE, NYSE MARKET
STRUCTURE REPORT 23-24 (2000) (describing NYSE technology initiatives), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/marketstructure.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
285. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2000). Exchange rule changes must also be approved in ac-
cordance with the exchange's constitution and by-laws. See infra Part III.B.
286. Request for Comments, supra note 93, at 30,516-19.
287. Mendelson & Peake, supra note 169, at 462.
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to attract, for example, new start-up companies that would not
otherwise qualify for the most stringent listing requirements.1
8
The Commission has worked over the past thirty years to
eliminate various exchange rules that, albeit anticompetitive, had
the effect of encouraging continued listing. The partial repeal and
eventual rescission of the prohibition against off-board trading,
discussed above, eliminates the regulatory guarantee that ex-
change members will provide their customers an exchange execu-
tion.2"9 Without the ability to prohibit off-board trading by their
members, exchanges must look to other tools at their disposal to
encourage members to bring orders to the exchange floor in order
to make good on the promise of liquidity for which listed issuers290pay.
At the same time, the Commission has sought the repeal of ex-
change rules that restrict "voluntary" delisting by issuers to en-
hance competition among markets for listings. Several exchanges,
for example, once had rules prohibiting an issuer from delisting
its securities unless a supermajority of its shareholders approved
the delisting and there was no objection to the delisting by a sig-
nificant minority of its shareholders.2 9' The ostensible purpose of
these rules was to protect shareholders from a decline in the
288. Silvia Ascarelli, Tiny Offerings on London's AIM Can Work Well Despite a Time of
Overall Investor Skittishness, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at C14 (describing the London
Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market); Neal E. Boudette, Neuer Markt's Bat-
tered Image May Be Poised for a Recovery, WALL ST. J., March 13, 2002, at Cll (describing
the recent scandals and regulatory reforms at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange's Neuer
Markt segment).
289. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. In this connection, NASDAQ has em-
barked on a campaign to promote "dual listing" of NYSE-listed firms on NASDAQ, on the
grounds that "dual listing on NASDAQ with its competitive market maker system should
benefit investors and shareholders by increasing liquidity, reducing execution time, and
narrowing spreads." Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Dual Listings,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,247, 69 Fed. Reg. 8254 (Mar. 13, 2004); see also NASDAQ
DUAL LISTING GUIDE: THE POWER OF CHOICE, at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/dual-
listingQ03-414_DualListingRevision.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
290. Exchanges, unlike market makers or broker-dealers, can charge for listings.
NASD Rule 2460 (prohibiting market makers from accepting compensation from issuers to
make markets in their stock). In one recently publicized incident, former NYSE CEO
Richard Grasso was alleged to have pressured the specialist in American International
Group Inc. to supply greater liquidity to its shares after a complaint from AIG's CEO, who
happened to sit on the NYSE's board of directors and compensation committee. Kate Kelly
& Susanne Craig, At Behest of AIG Chief Grasso Pushed NYSE Firm to Buy Stock, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at Al.
291. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 500.
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value of their shares as a result of the perceived loss in liquidity
from delisting. Under significant pressure from the Commission,
these rules have been revised to permit corporate officers and di-
rectors to delist securities without a shareholder vote.292
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 may also make
the exchanges' task of recruiting new domestic and foreign list-
ings much harder. Traditionally, foreign listings have been ex-
empt from many of the corporate governance requirements appli-
cable to U.S. companies, both under exchange rules and federal
securities law.293 For several years, the NYSE and other markets
have actively solicited listings by foreign companies interested in
tapping U.S. capital markets.294 Many foreign companies have
elected to list on U.S. exchanges in part because of the positive
signal conveyed to investors by the issuer's willingness to comply
with fuller disclosure requirements and greater protection for
minority investors.295 Because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies
across the board to all SEC-registered companies, there is grow-
ing concern that more foreign and U.S. companies will seek to "go
private" or otherwise reduce the number of U.S. shareholders to
avoid the Act's corporate governance requirements.296
292. Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to Voluntary Delist-
ing Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 42,198, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,616 (June 21, 2000)
(approving proposed AMEX rule change); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Relating to Voluntary Delistings by Listed Companies, Ex-
change Act Release No. 42,198, 64 Fed. Reg. 69,304 (Dec. 10, 1999) (approving proposed
CHX rule change); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments Nos. 1 and 2
Thereto Amending Exchange Rule 18, Exchange Act Release No. 41,634, 64 Fed. Reg.
40,633 (July 27, 1999) (approving proposed NYSE rule change). Consider, for example,
that forty-one percent of the NYSE's revenues derive from listing fees, Regulation of Mar-
ket Information Release, supra note 84, at 70,625, and the significant competition for list-
ings between the NYSE and the NASDAQ in recent years, particularly with respect to
technology IPOs. See, e.g., Reuters, In a Blow to the Big Board, Google Will List on the
NASDAQ, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at C2 (reporting that Google Inc. planned to list its
$2.7 billion initial public offering on the NASDAQ market, despite the NYSE's aggressive
efforts).
293. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (limiting the application of proxy rules to U.S. public
issuers).
294. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1757, 1778 (2002). According to the Commission, foreign listings on both the NYSE and
NASDAQ increased significantly during the 1990s. Request for Comment, supra note 93,
at 30,488 n.8.
295. Coffee, supra note 294, at 1780.
296. ROBERT C. POZEN, CAN EURoPEAN COMPANIES ESCAPE U.S. LISTINGS? (2004), at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter (last visited Mar. 26, 2005); Mark Lan-
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One possible consequence of these efforts is that primary ex-
changes such as the NYSE and the AMEX, as well as NASDAQ,
have been content to tolerate noncompliance with listing stan-
dards. The AMEX and NASDAQ, for example, have reserved the
discretion to list companies that do not meet their quantitative
standards for listing.2 97 There have also been concerns about the
laxity of exchanges' enforcement with maintenance standards for
listing."' In light of these trends, the ABA's Market Structure
Study has recommended that mandatory disclosure of noncompli-
ance with best practices, rather than enforcement of listing stan-
dards through the delisting process, might be a better way to
monitor corporate governance of public issuers.2 99
Another possibility is that exchanges will seek to expand trad-
ing in products other than listed securities. For example, the
NYSE has in recent years considered unlisted trading in
NASDAQ stocks, AMEX exchange-traded funds, and even deriva-
tive products to boost trading revenue.3 °° Regional exchanges
have sought to boost the volume of NASDAQ-listed securities
traded through their facilities.0 1 Exchanges may also seek to con-
der, Germans Weigh Taking Stocks Off Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004, at Cl;
Melinda Ligos, When Going Public May Not Be Worth It, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at C7.
But see Bob Greifeld, The View From NASDAQ, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2004, at A10 (disput-
ing the contention that Sarbanes-Oxley is problematic for NASDAQ); Kip Betz, Sarbanes-
Oxley Has Nominal Impact on Most ADR Issuers, Survey Concludes, CORP. L. DAILY (BNA)
(June 1, 2004) (noting that, according to a survey conducted by Broadgate Capital Advi-
sors and The Bank of New York, only eight percent of respondent foreign issuers whose
securities trade in the United States in the form of American Depositary Receipts believed
that the Act's requirements would lead them to reconsider participation in the U.S. securi-
ties markets); Coffee, supra note 293, at 1826 (suggesting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 could jeopardize the growing interest convergence to U.S. listing standards).
297. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES REGULATION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
IN THE AMEX LISTING PROGRAM 2 n.7 (2001) [hereinafter SECURITIES REGULATION],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new. items/d0218.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005) (noting
that NASDAQ had not listed a company pursuant to a waiver of a quantitative listing
standard since May 20, 1999).
298. Id. at 3 (noting that twenty-two percent of new AMEX listings between Sept. 1,
1999, and Nov. 13, 2000, did not meet AMEX's initial listing standards).
299. ABA Market Structure Study, supra note 2, at 1490. Disclosure of noncompliance,
for example, may be effected through the use of a modified listing symbol. See SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 297, at 13.
300. See, e.g., Beyond Equities, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004, at 79 (reporting that
the NYSE is considering whether to sponsor trading in additional ETFs, convertible
bonds, and derivative products based on its listed companies); Big Board to Trade Amex-
Listed Funds, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2001, at C5.
301. As a result of pairings between regional exchanges and alternative trading sys-
tems, regional exchanges are able to take credit for the latter's trading activity. See supra
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dition certain benefits-such as inclusion in proprietary market
indices-on continued or exclusive listing. °2
C. Impact of Competition on the Value of Membership
In addition to the problems faced by exchanges with respect to
external competition, exchanges must also deal with the problems
inherent in governing an association of broker-dealers. Tradition-
ally, exchanges were organized along a "not-for-profit" or "coop-
erative" model, under which the exchange's purpose was to pro-
vide facilities for the benefit of its members. 3  As a result,
exchange decisions were made by weighing competing interests of
multiple constituencies, rather than by reference to the impact on
the exchange's bottom line.3 °4 With the increase in competition
among exchanges, the interests of exchange management have
become much more focused on maximizing trading volume and
fee revenues to remain viable. As exchanges develop the ability to
automate execution of trades without the intermediation of spe-
cialists, floor brokers, and market makers, the interest of ex-
change management and its intermediaries become more diver-
gent.30
5
Meanwhile, the Commission's efforts to remove the anticom-
petitive restrictions imposed by exchanges on their members have
had the effect of reducing the advantages of exchange member-
ship. From a nonmember's perspective, the abolition of off-board
trading restrictions, the public dissemination of exchange quotes
and depth-of-book, and enhanced access to trading opportunities
on exchange floors through intermarket linkages reduce the in-
centive to become an exchange member and pay exchange trans-
action or regulatory fees. From a member's perspective, the in-
note 93 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., 2004 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 89 (prepared statement of Gerald
Putnam, CEO, Archipelago Holdings, L.L.C.) (contending that NASDAQ's rule limiting the
NASDAQ-100 and the associated "QQQ" exchange-traded fund to companies exclusively
listed on NASDAQ is intended to create a disincentive to dual listing on other exchanges).
303. See LEE, supra note 110, at 57.
304. One historically significant division was between the specialists and floor brokers
who execute trades and the public broker-dealers who bring in the customers. See gener-
ally Special Study, supra note 17, pt. 1, at 243.
305. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 372-73 (2002).
20051 1131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ability to collectively benefit from restrictive rules significantly
diminishes the value of an exchange seat. 6
These developments have prompted exchanges to take steps to
demutualize and become "for-profit" entities. Demutualization
would in theory allow exchange management to adopt rules and
new technologies without soliciting member approval and to
maximize revenue-such as by eliminating the intermediation of
its members in exchange transactions °.3 7 Demutualization also, in
theory, would allow exchanges to pursue strategic alliances with
other markets or to raise capital in equity markets to finance de-
velopment of joint trading platforms and associated services.0
More cynically, it would allow exchange members to extract a
premium for their exclusive access to exchange facilities before
exclusivity is gradually regulated out of existence. 9
The Commission has signaled its willingness to relax the fair
representation requirement and has already done so for a number
of automated exchanges.310 Moreover, the Commission has effec-
tively identified many of the key regulatory requirements one
might impose on a "for-profit" exchange in the context of Regula-
tion ATS and subsequent no-action and exemptive relief to those
exchanges that have aggressively pursued for-profit status. 1' Un-
settled questions remain, however, about the extent of the Com-
mission's regulatory authority over exchanges in light of demutu-
alization. To the extent that exchanges are expected to act in the
public interest-and that the fair representation requirement is
306. See id. at 410.
307. Fair Administration and Governance Release, supra note 6, at 71,132.
308. Id.
309. Big Board Seat Price Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at C5 (noting the significant
decline in NYSE seat prices since August 1999).
310. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 1 Thereto Relating to the Demutualization of the
Pacific Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,718, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,611 (May 24,
2004) [hereinafter Demutualization of the Pacific Exchange] (approving demutualization
of the Pacific Exchange); Findings and Opinion of Commission, Exchange Act Release No.
42,455, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,338 (Mar. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Findings and Opinion of Commis-
sioner] (discussing application of fair representation requirement to ISE, a for-profit LLC);
Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4. The Commission has proposed specific thresholds
for fair representation in its recent SRO Governance Concept Release. Demutualization of
the Pacific Exchange, supra, at 29,625-26.
311. PCX/Arca recently hired a former SEC Chairman at a salary of $600,000 a year to
advise it on governance issues. Miles Weiss, Archipelago Hires Ex-SEC Chief Breeden as
$600-K-a-Year Advisor, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 10, 2004.
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the only guarantor of that expectation-it is difficult for the
Commission to yield completely to the demutualization move-
ment.312
IV. THE COMMISSION'S EFFORTS TO RECONCILE SELF-
REGULATION AND THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
The Exchange Act thus requires exchanges to use their market
power to advance the regulatory goals of the federal securities
laws and to yield their market power by granting their competi-
tors greater access to their market information and trading sys-
tems. It is too early to speculate whether such competitive
forces 313 will undermine the self-regulatory mission of dominant
markets such as the NYSE.314 Nevertheless, the inherent contra-
diction in relying on market power for regulation while under-
mining market power in the name of competition may, to some
degree, explain why neither self-regulation nor the national mar-
ket system has appeared to be effective at accomplishing its in-
tended objectives.
Three recent Commission initiatives illustrate the regulatory
impasse created by the conflicting principles of self-regulation
and the national market system. First, the Commission has en-
countered significant difficulty in integrating new entrants into
the national market system. Second, the Commission has faced
hurdles in improving accessibility and transparency of orders
without infringing upon the autonomy of self-regulatory organi-
zations. Third, the Commission has struggled to improve the
fairness and quality of self-regulation without sacrificing the
benefits of the current competitive framework. Each of these is
discussed in turn.
312. Cf. NASD Rule 1017 (requiring application for approval of change in ownership,
control, or business of NASD member firms); NYSE Rule 304(b) (requiring approval of per-
sons who control a member or member organization). For example, it is unclear whether
the Commission would permit control of a registered national securities exchange to pass
to unregulated entities such as a nonbroker-dealer or foreign exchange. More problemati-
cally, the Commission might reserve the discretion to register "for-profit" private entities
as exchanges based not on neutral, nondiscriminatory criteria, but on subjective assess-
ment of the entity's willingness to abide by the "spirit" of the Exchange Act.
313. See supra Part III.
314. See supra Part II.
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A. Integrating New Entrants into the National Market System
The national market system was intended to reduce the mo-
nopoly power of exchanges within a controlled environment. Con-
gress and the Commission historically looked to the AMEX (with
respect to listings) and regional exchanges (with respect to trad-
ing) as the primary sources of competition to limit the NYSE's
market power; accordingly, they structured the national market
system mandate and mechanisms to improve regional exchanges'
access to information about current quotes and trades as well as
to provide regional exchanges with an opportunity to access the
NYSE.315 As a result, regional exchanges and over-the-counter
market makers through NASDAQ could "free ride" off the NYSE's
price discovery and, to a lesser extent, its liquidity at the best
published prices.
Congress and the Commission nevertheless sought to ensure
that self-regulatory objectives would not be compromised for the
sake of commercial advancement.316 While SROs were called upon
to engage in "rivalrous" competition within the national market
system, the only recognized competitors within the national mar-
ket system were SROs. National market system "plans" were
thus designed to replicate the anticompetitive power of exchanges
on a national level by creating a committee of self-regulatory or-
ganizations to make market structure decisions, not unlike the
way that broker-dealers were envisioned as collectively regulat-
ing themselves through individual self-regulatory organiza-
tions. 317 Because the primary exchanges, the regional exchanges,
315. Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on
Market Information and the Future of the National Market System, 57 BUS. LAW. 637, 640
(2002).
316. One consequence is that national market system mechanisms have been struc-
tured in a manner that allows the primary markets to limit access to its facilities by other
markets, lest nonmembers obtain the benefits of the NYSE's liquidity without the inter-
mediation of a NYSE member. For example, the NYSE succeeded in restricting the ability
of the Pacific Exchange to integrate its proposed application of the Optimark system into
national market system mechanisms by placing a ceiling on the volume of orders PCX was
permitted to route to the NYSE specialist through ITS, relative to PCX's volume. Inter-
market Trading System, Exchange Act Release No. 41,668, 64 Fed. Reg. 42,734, 42,735
(Aug. 5, 1999) (approving amendment to the Restated ITS Plan Linking the Pacific Ex-
change's Application of the OptiMark System to the Intermarket Trading System).
317. Karmel, supra note 305, at 397 (contrasting the SEC's abolition of fixed commis-
sions with the SEC's market data consortium); see also Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1491.
In particular, national market system mechanisms are established through "plans," which
the Commission has the power to approve or amend to the same extent as the rules of in-
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and the NASD jointly dictate national market mechanisms, their
self-regulatory power is pooled into a regulatory cartel that sets
the ground rules for competition among themselves.318
Unfortunately, this structure has allowed established ex-
changes to shut new entrants out of the national market system
by denying them a seat at the table in designing national market
system mechanisms 9.3  As a result, the Commission has struggled
to integrate new competitors-such as alternative trading sys-
tems-into a system run by the entities they are competing
against. The only way to eliminate such conflicts of interest, un-
der the Commission's current policy, is to permit-or, in some
cases, require-new challengers to register as national securities
exchanges.
In Regulation ATS, the Commission revised its definition of an
"exchange" to include the alternative trading systems that, in its
view, are able pose a significant competitive challenge to estab-
lished exchanges.32° The SEC's broadened definition covers any
entity that "[u]ses established, non-discretionary methods
(whether by providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under
which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and
sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade."321
dividual self-regulatory organizations. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAa3-2 (2004) (describing the
processes for plan adoption and amendment).
318. A useful analogy here is the manner in which options markets are regulated. Be-
cause there is no over-the-counter market in options, all securities options contracts must
be executed on a national securities exchange. As a result, the Commission is able to regu-
late competition among a closed universe of trading venues.
319. Recent cases suggest that the conduct of national securities exchanges and the
NASD under the aegis of national market system plans approved by the Commission will
be immune from antitrust liability, regardless of whether the Commission takes express
action to prevent such conduct or believes antitrust immunity is appropriate, as long as it
has the authority under the Exchange Act to regulate such conduct. In re Stock Exchs. Op-
tions Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 150 (2d Cir. 2003); Friedman v. Salo-
mon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 800-01 (2d Cir. 2002); see supra Part II.A.
320. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2004). Oddly, the Commission achieved this result not
through an interpretation of the term "exchange," but rather through an interpretation, in
Rule 3b-16, of the phrase "a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions
commonly performed by a stock exchange," which appears in the statutory definition of the
term "exchange." Id. § 240.3b-16(a). This circumlocution was presumably necessary to al-
low the Commission to use its exemptive authority under section 36 of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78jj (2000), to exclude alternative trading systems that comply with Regula-
tion ATS from the definition of an exchange, and not just the registration requirement for
national securities exchanges.
321. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a)(2) (2004). This definition is intended to cover alternative
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Those markets that wish to register as exchanges and take up the
heavy burden of self-regulation may pull up a seat at the national
market system table.322 Those that do not are deemed to elect
"voluntarily" to comply with the rules set out by the self-
regulatory organizations of which they are members. 23
There are a few problems with this approach. First, it is not
clear whether many existing exchanges would meet such a defini-
tion of "exchange," applied literally, given the substantial blur-
ring of auction and dealer functions in many markets.324 The
trend among exchanges, as described above, is to promote greater
internalization of orders through their facilities without sacrific-
ing price priority, rather than to employ stricter trading rules to
improve price discovery. At best, exchanges preserve an expecta-
tion of direct order interaction today only in the sense that other
exchange members may not trade at an inferior price without ac-
cepting their order first.325 By modifying the definition of ex-
change in this manner, the Commission invites inquiry into
whether existing exchanges may modify their trading rules with-
out sacrificing their regulatory status.
More generally, such efforts threaten to reduce "self-
regulation" to a series of formalistic arrangements necessary to
gain entr6e into the national market system. It is unrealistic for
the Commission to define "exchange" retroactively by reference to
their order interaction processes, when such systems lack the
membership structure, internal enforcement mechanisms, and
market power to carry out the self-regulatory mandate of section
6 of the Exchange Act. Indeed, the Commission does not even an-
ticipate that new exchanges would perform any of those man-
dates-as with the regional exchanges, they would be expected to
trading systems with price discovery mechanisms that were formerly excluded from the
statutory definition of exchange under the Delta Release and the corresponding no-action
relief issued by the Commission. See generally Delta Release, supra note 10.
322. But see Findings and Opinion of Commission, supra note 310, at 11,388 (approving
the ISE as an exchange for trading securities options).
323. See Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,847.
324. Maynard, supra note 72, at 848-50. To illustrate the application of its interpreta-
tion, the Commission provided descriptions of twenty trading systems together with a
brief analysis as to whether they would or would not be considered an exchange. Regula-
tion of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,854-56.
325. See, e.g., 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 9 (testimony of William
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC) ("I suspect that customers generally expect their better-
priced orders to be protected within an exchange.").
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outsource such obligations through regulatory delegation agree-
ments.326 There is also little sense in imposing special "fair repre-
sentation" and "public interest" requirements on electronic trad-
ing systems, when the trend is for exchanges to demutualize and
go public.327
The marketplace, to some extent, has already illustrated this
problem. As described above, some alternative trading systems
have begun to explore strategic alliances with regional exchanges
to obtain the benefits of exchange status without registering
themselves.328 Such developments partly address some of the in-
equities of the current structure--e.g., by allowing for more ra-
tional sharing of market structure fees. But they also threaten to
reduce the regulatory status of regional exchanges to a transfer-
able regulatory license-akin to a New York City taxicab "medal-
lion"-that provides a portal into the national market system,
confers the imprimatur of an exchange execution, and entitles the
purchaser to a share of market data revenue.329
Going forward, it will become increasingly difficult to justify
excluding market makers and high-volume broker-dealers from
national market system mechanisms as they increase the volume
of their securities trading and provide greater opportunities for
order interaction among their customers. Historically, the NASD
has relied on market makers to generate liquidity in its
NASDAQ-quoted securities, but as NASDAQ has developed its
own order execution technology, its interests have also diverged
326. Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,882.
327. Karmel, supra note 21, at 370-84.
328. For example, as a result of the commercial relationships developed between Insti-
net (an alternative trading system) and the National Stock Exchange ("NSX"), and be-
tween Archipelago (an alternative trading system) and the Pacific Exchange ("PCX"), both
the NSX and the PCX have experienced a significant increase in market data revenues
with respect to NASDAQ stocks. See Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,179
(noting that NSX receives approximately $32.3 million in market data revenue, or eight
percent of net market revenues allocated among the SROs, and PCX receives approxi-
mately $38.8 million, or ten percent of net allocated market revenues); Fair Administra-
tion and Governance Release, supra note 6, at 71,131.
329. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 39,884, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,504, 23,504 (Apr. 29, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
202, 240, 242, 249) [hereinafter Regulation of Exchanges and ATS Proposing Release];
Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,880. Such an exchange would presumably
retain its governance structure and remain subject to the requirement to file rule changes
and ensure fair access and fair representation; to the extent that the exchange would be
entirely dependent on its strategic partner for survival, the exchange would likely lack the
power to exercise any self-regulatory responsibility with respect to its marketplace.
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from those of its market making members. 330 As a result, larger
market makers may seek greater freedom to offer quotes directly
to the public through national market system facilities, rather
than through the facilities created by NASDAQ. It is difficult to
conceive of a further redefinition of the term "exchange" that
would achieve this result.33'
B. Best Execution and Individual Market Access
The Commission has also found it exceedingly difficult to pro-
mote the national market system goals of transparency and ac-
cess across markets without infringing upon the autonomy con-
ferred on self-regulatory organizations by the Exchange Act. On
the one hand, the Commission has used its rule-making and en-
forcement authority to require broker-dealers and alternative
trading systems to improve their order handling practices-i.e.,
the routing, display, and execution of orders-consistent with the
national market system mandate. 32 On the other hand, the
Commission has been unwilling to pressure exchanges and self-
regulating markets such as NASDAQ to make the corresponding
accommodations to facilitate efficient access to their market sys-
tems. 3  The result is a series of Commission rules imposed on
330. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Permanently Expand Order Entry Firm
Access to SIZE in Nasdaq's SuperMontage System, Exchange Act Release No. 47,588, 68
Fed. Reg. 16,323, 16,323 (Apr. 3, 2003) (approving proposed rule change allowing member
firms other than market makers to submit nonmarketable limit orders to NASDAQ for
display through its quotation montage without the intermediation of a market making
member).
331. Trading systems operated by broker-dealers and registered market makers are
excluded from exchange registration, provided that matching or crossing of orders is inci-
dental to their order routing, dealing, or market making activities. See, e.g., Regulation of
Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,884. It is not clear, however, whether the Commission
could defend an interpretation of the term exchange that would encompass such systems,
e.g., if a market maker opted for direct Commission regulation as an exchange instead of
joining a self-regulatory organization, given that Congress clearly did not intend to regu-
late over-the-counter market makers as exchanges at the time the Exchange Act was
adopted.
332. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(iv) (2000) (enumerating as one of the goals of the na-
tional market system the practicability of executing investors' orders in the best market).
333. The Commission's use of its rule-making authority to establish national market
system mechanisms is also subject to statutory challenge-in the same manner that Busi-
ness Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), circumscribed the Commission's
authority to adopt exchange rules establishing corporate governance standards-to the
extent that the Commission is merely directed to "facilitate" the mechanisms of a national
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members of self-regulatory organizations without the correspond-
ing access to self-regulatory facilities necessary to carry them out.
1. NASDAQ and ATS Order Display
One example is the impact of the Commission's order handling
rules on NASDAQ's ability to modernize its marketplace.
NASDAQ, after much prompting from the Commission, sought
throughout the 1980s and 1990s to improve automatic execution
systems for market makers to compete more effectively with pri-
mary markets . 3 4 The Commission, during the same period,
adopted minimum standards for the display and accessibility of
certain best-priced orders held by alternative trading systems.335
In addition to providing its orders to a national securities ex-
change or association for inclusion in its published quotation
data, the alternative trading system was required to provide ac-
cess "[elquivalent to the ability of [any] broker-dealer to effect a
transaction with other orders displayed on the exchange or by the
association."336 As a result, alternative trading systems either had
to cease their operations or to integrate their execution systems
with those of a self-regulatory organization. For NASDAQ-listed
securities, the only SRO system through which such integration
was possible was NASDAQ.
The Commission's rule did not, however, require any self-
regulatory organization to make reasonable accommodation for
displaying its members' quotes, consistent with the principle that
self-regulatory organizations should enjoy a free hand in design-
ing their trading systems. 337 As a result, NASDAQ's efforts to
market system. Oesterle, supra note 85, at 1.
334. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by the Chi-
cago Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Trading of Nasdaq/NM Securities, Exchange Act
Release No. 50,620, 69 Fed. Reg. 65,000, 65,000 (Nov. 9, 2004).
335. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAc1-1(c)(5)-(6) (2004) (explaining display requirement for mar-
ket maker quotes entered into an "electronic communications network"); id. § 240.11Acl-4
(2004) (explaining customer order display requirements for market makers); id. §
242.301(b)(3) (2004) (explaining customer order display requirements for alternative trad-
ing systems).
336. Id. § 242.301(b)(3)(iii)(A) (2004); see also id. § 240.11Acl-l(c)(5)(ii)(A)(2)(i) (2004)
(giving the corresponding standard under the Commission's order handling rules for mar-
ket maker best-priced orders).
337. NASDAQ generally had a free hand in designing and implementing the national
market system plan for over-the-counter NASDAQ-traded securities since trading in
NASDAQ-listed securities by regional exchanges was historically limited. Request for
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modernize its quotation collection and execution facilities were
hampered by several rounds of public notice and comment, as al-
ternative trading systems sought to ensure that they would be
able to use NASDAQ to stay in business without drastic changes
to their business model."' The Commission eventually chose to
require the NASD to create an alternative display facility and de-
velop "direct access" rules, rather than require NASDAQ or any
other marketplace to make all changes perceived as necessary by
the Commission. 9
2. Trade-Through Rules
Similar issues have arisen with respect to the tension between
broker-dealers' duty of best execution and the technological capa-
bilities of primary exchanges. Broker-dealers have a duty, under
the Commission's antifraud rules and SRO rules, to obtain the
best terms for customer transactions reasonably available under
Comment on Nasdaq Petition Relating to the Regulation of Nasdaq-Listed Securities, 68
Fed. Reg. 27,722, 27,723 (May 20, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). As a result of re-
cent developments, the Commission has required the NASDAQ-UTP Plan to establish
more neutral criteria for selecting service providers. See Order Approving Proposed Rule
Changes, supra note 101, at 8022-23.
338. Two such technical issues that created significant problems in the negotiation of
NASDAQ SuperMontage facility were automated execution and access fees. NASDAQ
sought to require market makers to provide automatic execution at their quoted prices-
i.e., if a market maker's NASDAQ quote indicates that it is willing to buy 1000 shares at
$10, NASDAQ would automatically execute an incoming NASDAQ order to sell 1000
shares against the market maker's quote, even if the market maker simultaneously re-
ceived and executed an order for 1000 shares from its own customer. The market maker is
thus required to execute a total of 2000 shares at the quoted price, even though it had only
advertised a willingness to buy 1000 shares. Because many alternative trading systems do
not trade for their proprietary accounts, however, they cannot generally take on such risk.
With respect to access fees, market makers have not been permitted to charge a fee for
execution against their public quotes, since they have traditionally profited from the bid-
ask spread. Since alternative trading systems operate on a commission basis, the inability
to charge an access fee would require them either to charge a separate fee for quote access
through NASDAQ or to modify their customer orders to reflect a fee. The ability to charge
an additional fee through NASDAQ, however, raises concerns insofar as the net cost of
trading with an alternative trading system may be higher than its quoted price would
suggest. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to Super-
Montage to accommodate order-delivery to alternative trading systems and discussions of
access fees). In response to significant complaints from the securities industry, the Com-
mission is proposing to cap access fees. See Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at
11,158-59.
339. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 101, at 8024-30 (describ-
ing the alternative display facility).
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the circumstances ("best execution")."' In the context of a na-
tional market system, brokers must theoretically route orders to
an exchange or market that either matches or improves upon the
best price quoted in the "national best bid and offer," or reroutes
such orders to the market quoting the superior price.341 To do so,
the prices of markets quoting superior prices must in theory be
"accessible" by such broker-dealers, even if they are not members
of the relevant market.
The only mechanism that allows such access for exchange-
listed securities is the Intermarket Trading System ("ITS").342 The
Commission has long sought to develop a system by which bro-
ker-dealers could access all quotes and orders in the marketplace,
in order to provide public limit orders with a better chance of exe-
cution. Though such a system has been disregarded as not "feasi-
ble, 343 the ITS allows regional exchanges to access the quote of a
primary exchange specialist-and vice versa-in the event a re-
gional specialist or market maker does not want to match the
quote currently offered by the primary exchange. "Trading
through" the quote of an ITS participant (i.e., dealing with a cus-
tomer at an inferior price) contravenes the obligations of ITS par-
ticipants under the ITS Plan.3"
340. Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,137; NASD Rule 2320. The SEC
has further indicated its belief that "best execution" for most investors means "best price."
341. Many alternative trading systems and market makers will route orders to another
market, rather than match them internally, when the other market offers a superior price.
2003 House Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 164 (prepared statement of Ed Nicoll, CEO,
Instinet Group) (analogizing this strategy to the strategy employed by Macy's Kris Kringle
in Miracle on 34th Street). In part, this is necessary to comply with best-execution re-
quirements. It also allows the trading system to market itself as a system capable of order
routing decisions, thus giving it "first crack" at orders that would otherwise be routed to
another market for execution. There is, however, little incentive for a market with domi-
nant power to route an order to competing markets.
342. While the SEC's recently proposed trade-through rules would apply to NASDAQ-
listed securities as well, the NASDAQ market and participating market makers and ATSs
are accessible through automated access. Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at
11,134.
343. Id. at 11,132-36.
344. A "trade through" under the ITS Plan is not, however, a violation of Commission
rules; the rule is enforceable solely at the discretion of the market whose quote is "traded
through." Thus, if Market Y is quoting a bid for 100 shares at $10, and Market X trades
through Market Y's quote by executing a sale of 100 shares for Customer A at $9.95, Cus-
tomer A does not have an actionable claim for the additional $5 he would have received
had his order been executed against Market Ys quote. Market Y, however, may seek to
recover the difference between its quote and the execution price on Market X ($5) to pro-
tect its quoted price.
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As both regional exchanges and third market participants be-
gan to automate their execution capabilities, the protocols for ITS
have become increasingly cumbersome. In particular, automated
markets have argued that, for many customers, the certainty of
obtaining an immediate execution at a marginally inferior price is
preferable to the possibility of obtaining an execution at the supe-
rior price offered by a nonautomated market-e.g., a specialist-
intermediated exchange such as the NYSE or the AMEX. Oppo-
nents of the trade-through rule have further accused the ex-
changes of using ITS as a tool to preserve their anticompetitive
power.345 As a result, automated markets have sought the right to
"trade through" the quotes of nonautomated markets since their
ability to access the price quoted by the nonautomated market
through ITS within a specified period of time is sufficiently ques-
tionable.346
To resolve this tension successfully, the Commission could ei-
ther (i) establish uniform access criteria for all markets and man-
date order interaction or (ii) eliminate the trade-through rule al-
together and allow market participants to access the market
center of their choice. Uniform access criteria would make real
the promise of best execution by requiring exchanges to modern-
ize their facilities immediately. Eliminating the trade-through
rule could similarly accomplish the longstanding goal of pressur-
ing the NYSE and the AMEX to automate or to eliminate special-
ists altogether by raising the competitive stakes for the ex-
changes, but at the risk of creating a two-tiered market for listed
securities for the foreseeable future. The Commission has never-
theless sought to have it both ways: its proposed solutions to date
purport to uphold the principles of best execution and intermar-
ket price protection while riddling the ITS trade-through rule
345. See 2004 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 6; 2003 House Hearings, supra note 1,
at 159 (testimony of Robert H. McCooey, Jr., CEO, Griswold Co., Inc.); Kate Kelly, Is 'Best
Price'Best? Depends Who You Ask, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2004, at Cl.
346. For example, ITS protocols traditionally allowed the market receiving a request to
trade at its quoted price a specific period of time for the receiving specialist or market
maker to execute the order or to reject the order and update its quote. With the automa-
tion of trading systems, markets offering instantaneous executions do not believe it is ap-
propriate to be required to route orders to markets where execution remains subject to
human discretion, since the allowed time delay effectively gives the receiving specialist or
market maker a "free option" to execute or reject the order. Proposed Regulation NMS,
supra note 5, at 11,134.
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with exceptions that make it inapplicable to many transactions
that trade through the NYSE and AMEX quotes.34
The Commission's proposed Regulation NMS, as reproposed in
December 2004, seems designed to strengthen, rather than un-
dermine, the trade-through rule. The reproposed rule would re-
quire market centers to display most trading interest to the pub-
lic and extend the trade-through prohibition to all publicly
displayed orders in a market center's book rather than the best
price.348 Markets with significant liquidity but slow trading sys-
tems (such as the NYSE and the AMEX) would benefit signifi-
cantly from such a rule, at the expense of markets with "fast"
trading systems but sparse liquidity. Without any corresponding
requirement that the exchanges comply with a minimum stan-
dard of access that reflects modern technological capabilities, it is
difficult to see how the proposal would advance market struc-
ture.34 9
C. Exchange Governance
Recent scandals and growing industry concern about the fair-
ness of self-regulation has prompted the Commission and the se-
curities industry to reform the current self-regulatory struc-
ture.35 ° Many of the Commission's proposals to date are designed
to improve the transparency of exchange decision making and
remove conflicts of interest involving particular executives. Not
347. The Commission has exempted the most actively traded exchange-traded funds
from the ITS trade-through rules by allowing trade-throughs to occur at up to $0.03 away
from the best quoted price. See Order Granting De Minimis Exemption for Transactions in
Certain Exchange-Traded Funds from the Trade-Through Provisions of the Intermarket
Trading System, Exchange Act Release No. 46,428, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Sept. 4,
2002); see also Order Extending a De Minimis Exemption for Transactions in Certain Ex-
change-Traded Funds from the Trade-Through Provisions of the Intermarket Trading Sys-
tem, Exchange Act Release No. 50,795, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,445 (Dec. 9, 2004). The Commis-
sion has also sought comment on a proposal to allow automated markets to trade through
nonautomated markets generally under proposed Regulation NMS. See Proposed Regula-
tion NMS, supra note 5, at 11,135.
348. See generally Reproposed Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 50,870, 69
Fed. Reg. 77,424 (Dec. 27, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249,
270).
349. As a result, the proposal has been criticized as a sop to the NYSE. See, e.g., SEC
Loves NYSE, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2004, at A14.
350. See LEE, supra note 110, at 297-300 (discussing alternative regulatory struc-
tures).
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surprisingly, these responses borrow heavily from the corporate
governance rule-making initiatives promulgated pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Industry proposals, by contrast, target in-
dustry's growing concern with the conflicts inherent in markets
regulating their members when their financial interests diverge.
Among these initiatives are consolidation of certain SRO respon-
sibilities in a single self-regulatory organization,35' segregation of
the self-regulatory arm of existing exchanges, or even direct regu-
lation of broker-dealer activities by the Commission. 52
D. Commission Initiatives
While the political impetus behind the Commission's efforts to
address SRO governance appears to be the NYSE's recent execu-
tive compensation and specialist trading scandals,5 3 the propos-
als address other long-standing concerns about existing ex-
changes' operational and financial condition as well as the
governance of new entrants and demutualized exchanges. Pro-
posed governance rules would make exchange boards more inde-
pendent and heighten their oversight role with respect to ex-
change management, segregate market and regulatory
operations, and check the influence of individual member/owners
of demutualized exchanges over exchange governance.5 4 Disclo-
351. Seligman, supra note 34, at 1384-87 (suggesting a PCAOB-like regulator).
352. For example, the Securities Industry Association's Ad Hoc Committee on the
Regulatory Implications of Demutualization has proposed five alternative models for the
future regulation of the securities industry, including: (i) multiple exchanges with sepa-
rate boards and information barriers, as is the case with the NASD and NASDAQ, (ii)
multiple SROs with firms designated to a single SRO for examination purposes (the "DEA
Model"), (iii) a hybrid model, in which member regulation is effected by a single SRO, and
individual markets regulate their own trading, (iv) a single SRO for all purposes, and (v)
SEC regulation. See SIA White Paper, supra note 2. The Commission published these al-
ternatives for public comment in a recent concept release concerning self-regulation. Con-
cept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,256 (Dec. 8, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
353. The NYSE took a number of steps to address these developments, including reor-
ganization of and allocation of operational and regulatory responsibilities among the board
of directors, a board of executives, and various exchange committees, and an agreement to
separate the functions of chairman and chief executive officer. One commentator has ques-
tioned whether such reforms address the fundamental governance problems inherent in
self-regulation. Seligman, supra note 34, at 1373-77.
354. Fair Administration and Governance Release, supra note 6, at 71,187-89 (describ-
ing Proposed Exchange Act Rules 6a-5 and 15Aa-3). A concomitant requirement would be
imposed on registered broker-dealers to disclose their ownership interest in a demutual-
ized SRO. Id. at 71,192-94 (describing Proposed Exchange Act Rule 17a-27).
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sure rules would provide greater disclosure regarding financial
information including revenue sources, surveillance efforts, and
the adequacy of regulatory efforts and internal controls.355
E. Industry Initiatives
Industry proposals to reform self-regulation, by contrast, seek
further steps to eliminate the conflicts of interest in regulation by
multiple, competing SROs rather than to improve the integrity of
the current self-regulatory system. From the industry's perspec-
tive, the loss of dominant power by a self-regulatory exchange af-
fects regulation in two ways. First, the exchange will be tempted
to abuse its self-regulatory authority to deter competition from
systems that pose a threat-however inchoate-to their market
power. Second, the exchange will have a heightened incentive to
relax enforcement of their listing and business conduct standards
to preserve their loyal customer base, since these are the least
critical to the exchange's competitive mission. Industry proposals
accordingly seek further segregation of self-regulatory authority
from exchange operations-particularly with respect to enforce-
ment of business conduct standards that directly affect a mem-
ber's discretion to trade on the exchange.356
The result of proposal reform would be to phase out member-
oriented self-regulation.5 7 The potential drawback of this ap-
proach is that the SEC would lose significant leverage over ex-
change listing and trading rules with respect to which it has no
rule-making authority or appetite. If individual exchanges are re-
lieved of the obligation to exercise self-regulatory responsibility,
355. Id. at 71,155-67 (describing Revised Exchange Act Form 1, Proposed Exchange
Act Form 2, and Proposed Exchange Act Rules 15Aa-1 and 17a-26).
356. For example, proposals to consolidate order flow effectively alleviate retail broker-
dealers from any duty to obtain best execution for their customers, since there would be
only one pipeline for routing orders.
357. The implication of the governance releases is that the Commission would allow
SROs greater freedom to modify trading practices and listing rules-including with re-
spect to the activities of their specialists and market makers. For example, the Commis-
sion's proposed SRO governance rules address the problem of adequate oversight of affili-
ated companies of an SRO that propose to list on the SRO's market. See Fair
Administration and Governance Release, supra note 6, at 71,150-53 (describing proposed
Regulation AL). Perhaps the most prominent example of this phenomenon in the United
States is NASDAQ's proposal to list its shares on the NASDAQ National Market. See, e.g.,
NASDAQ Files to Sell Up to $100 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2004, at Al.
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the Commission cannot seek voluntary improvements in market
structure without elaborate rule making because the bargaining
chip of member-oriented self-regulation will no longer be on the
table .3
Proposals for self-regulatory reform that seek to maintain the
status quo focus on facilitating greater cooperation among ex-
changes, rather than outright consolidation of exchange author-
ity. In its Market Structure Study, the Committee on Market
Structure of the American Bar Association proposed requiring the
NYSE, the AMEX, and NASDAQ to work in concert to develop
best practices for public companies.359 In theory, as the sole listing
authorities capable of granting access to national market system
mechanisms, among other things, this troika could develop uni-
form standards for their listed companies. Because individual
markets are likely to avoid delisting issuers, however, the pro-
posal falls short of recommending that the three SROs enforce
compliance with those standards. The principal benefit of such a
proposal would be disclosure of compliance or noncompliance.
V. DISPERSING SELF-REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES
ACROSS A NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
To the extent that the principle of self-regulation and the goals
of the national market system are inherently at odds, policy al-
ternatives to the current regulatory framework are often pre-
sented as a choice between consolidated regulation and unregu-
lated competition. Another approach to addressing the
conundrum of self-regulation is a return to first principles: as we
move away from an exchange-centered securities marketplace,
self-regulatory obligations must be publicly allocated to another
body representative of the securities industry that has the mar-
ket power, operational expertise, and financial resources to carry
them out.
Rather than the Commission or a single SRO, the appropriate
body for many-but not all-regulatory functions may well be an
association of "market centers," governed by a subset of the most
358. Conversely, it would be difficult for the SEC to cajole SROs to establish market
facilities-such as the NASD's ADF-to accommodate SEC regulatory initiatives.
359. ABA Market Structure Study, supra note 2, at 1490.
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influential.36 ° Specifically, a national market system plan (the
"Plan") may be envisioned (i) in which all market centers, includ-
ing exchanges, trading systems, and market makers, must either
become direct participants or be associated with a direct partici-
pant; (ii) whose governing participants are determined not by
regulatory status, but rather by volume of trading or other objec-
tive criteria; and (iii) whose governing participants periodically
change to reflect changes in trading patterns or migration of vol-
ume.
3 6 1
The objective of such a structure would be to give major market
centers an "ownership interest" in the infrastructure and ground
rules of the securities marketplace, circumscribed by Commission
approval and the limited antitrust immunity conferred by the Ex-
change Act. Under such a structure, the Commission would effec-
tively exchange its pervasive authority over a subset of major
markets with more limited authority (through its power to ap-
prove, disapprove, or modify national market system plans) over
a more representative consortium of market centers.362 Such a so-
lution would also punt the difficult questions raised by regulation
360. The Commission has long recognized the need to develop a new term to encompass
centers of trading activity other than "exchanges" or the "over-the-counter market." In its
recent rule making, the Commission has defined the "market center" (including individual
market makers, exchange specialists, and alternative trading systems) as the relevant
unit for assessing execution quality of markets that are required to display public quotes.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.11Aci-5-.llAcl-6. In Regulation NMS, the Commission took the
further step of defining the phrase "order execution facility," for purposes of its proposed
trade-through rule, to encompass exchanges, alternative trading systems, exchange spe-
cialists and market makers, over-the-counter market makers, and broker-dealers execut-
ing orders internally as principal or agent. Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at
11,135.
361. For example, a national market system might be administered by the ten market
centers with the highest trading volume, subject to minimum representation of certain
categories of market center--e.g., specialists, market makers, and alternative trading sys-
tems. All market centers-exchange, trading systems and market makers-with sufficient
trading volume would have the choice to become direct participants or to access the na-
tional market system through other direct participants, e.g., NASDAQ. Nonvoting partici-
pation might also be extended to other entities, as proposed by the Commission in the
Governance Amendments outlined in Regulation NMS-e.g., broker-dealers with a sub-
stantial retail investor customer base, broker-dealers with a substantial institutional in-
vestor customer base, data vendors, and investors. Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note
5, at 11,199.
362. Without belaboring the analogy, one might view the proposal as replacing the cur-
rent "League of Nations" approach to regulating markets-in which a few powerful yet
nonrepresentative markets dictate market norms-with a "United Nations" model-in
which a more representative set of markets might constructively achieve the more modern
goal of standardizing protocols for market access and information.
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of specialists and market makers-with the expectation that such
concerns are better addressed through improved competition
rather than regulation.
The "demythologization" of stock exchanges could proceed in
roughly three phases: (i) delegation of primary responsibility for
audit trails and market oversight to the Plan; (ii) delegation of
primary responsibility for adopting and enforcing listing stan-
dards relating to corporate governance to the Plan; and (iii) dele-
gation of business conduct supervision to a single or multiple
SROs independent of any market center.
A. Centralized Market Infrastructure and Oversight
At a minimum, a central Plan, and not the Commission, should
be responsible for sorting through the appropriate infrastructure
for order dissemination and access as well as the related over-
sight of order handling and market surveillance. Such a Plan
could assume responsibility for structuring systems for collecting
and disseminating market data and developing a uniform audit
trail for monitoring of securities market transactions. Plan rules
could be implemented by contractual arrangements with existing
service providers, e.g., NASDAQ and SIAC, and enforced by an
existing self-regulatory organization, such as NASD, or by the
Commission directly. 63 As with all national market system plans,
the discretion of governing participants would be constrained by
the Commission's ultimate authority to approve, disapprove, or
promulgate Plan provisions-in particular, the fees charged for
market information and access to publicly displayed orders.
Such a structure preserves the influence of today's dominant
markets-such as the NYSE and NASDAQ-with respect to mar-
ket oversight but with equal treatment for, and an opportunity to
363. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000) (conferring the power to enforce MSRB rules on
the NASD or other appropriate regulatory authority); Proposed Rule Charge Relating to
the Creation of a Corporate Bond Trade Reporting and Transaction Facility and the
Elimination of Nasdaq's Fixed Income Pricing System, Exchange Act Release No. 43,616,
65 Fed. Reg. 71,174, 71,178 (Nov. 29, 2000) (allowing the NASD to contract with NASDAQ
to establish and maintain a transaction reporting system for corporate debt); Order Ap-
proving Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 101, at 8022 (requiring the NASDAQ-UTP
Plan to select the securities information processor for NASDAQ-listed securities through a
competitive process).
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participate in governance by, nonexchanges. By eliminating ex-
change registration as a prerequisite to participation in or gov-
ernance of national market system mechanisms, market systems
would be developed by a set of market participants more repre-
sentative of securities trading patterns.364 Foreign exchanges
could also be permitted to participate in national market system
mechanisms-e.g., through a registered U.S. entity-with more
limited expectations regarding their self-regulatory obligations.365
As is the case today, the natural inclination of governing mem-
bers to impose their technology or standards on other market par-
ticipants must be checked by Commission oversight.366 Using ob-
jective criteria to dictate who participates in the market system,
however, rather than the subjective registration of certain sys-
tems as exchanges, allows for a more representative body of mar-
kets to make the decision about intermarket mechanisms and
may increase the incentives for participants to make reasonable
accommodation for other market participants. 367 This should also
364. Although the Exchange Act provides that the SROs are to work jointly to develop
the mechanisms of a national market system, it is arguable that additional legislation is
not necessary to open full participation in national market system plans to market centers
other than self-regulatory organizations. Certain trading systems have, historically, par-
ticipated in national market system plans (Instinet), and the Commission has considered
the possibility of allowing some such trading systems not registered as exchanges to par-
ticipate directly in national market system plans. Request for Comments, supra note 93,
at 30,487. Conversely, registered exchanges could choose or be encouraged to deregister to
the extent they do not provide self-regulatory services without significantly affecting the
benefits they receive.
365. The Commission has previously suggested allowing foreign exchanges to register
as "securities information processors" in the United States under section 11A(b) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(b) (2000). See Request for Comments, supra note 93, at
30,487.
366. Plan participants have long been able to use their veto power to prevent Plan
amendments inimical to their interests. To overcome this problem the Commission could
adopt a supermajority voting requirement or subject Plans adopted with less than unani-
mous approval to heightened review. It is also possible simply to allow dominant markets
to opt out of national market plans and establish their own Plans, particularly to the ex-
tent that their market information or liquidity is perceived to be more valuable because of
the type of order flow they handle. See, e.g., J. Harold Mulherin, Market Transparency:
Pros, Cons and Property Rights, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION:
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 375-81 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr.
eds., 1992). In such case, the Commission would scrutinize their proposed data and access
standards to ensure consistency with the public interest and the terms of other Plans, to
the greatest extent possible.
367. The Commission has recognized the need for an "advisory committee" represent-
ing market centers other than exchanges and self-regulatory organizations. Proposed
Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,127. Given that the SEC regularly convenes advisory
committees, public roundtables, and other for the purpose of soliciting comment on pro-
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create competitive incentives for today's SROs to be more respon-
sible to their members to improve their internal governance
structures, lest members elect to participate directly in the na-
tional market system or through another intermediary.
While the initial mandate of the Plan would be to build the ba-
sic oversight infrastructure, such a Plan could resolve some of the
problems faced by the Commission in its attempt to integrate al-
ternative trading systems into the public markets. For example,
exchanges and other trading venues have more operational fa-
miliarity with the minimum protocols feasible for access to their
best quote or their published quotes.36 As a result, it is appropri-
ate that they, and not the Commission, be required to develop
such protocols in the first instance. The Commission's role, con-
sistent with the premises of self-regulation, is to wield Justice
William 0. Douglas's proverbial "shotgun behind the door"-i.e.,
to threaten market centers with termination of market reve-
nues, 369 standardized regulation, or other undesirable alterna-
tives if markets are unable to agree, and to enforce such stan-
dards if the market centers prove unwilling to do so.37°
B. National Market Standards and Individual Listing
Requirements
A central Plan could also exercise the authority to designate
the nonquantitative criteria-i.e., corporate governance require-
posed market structure initiatives, including representatives of all major market partici-
pants, it would seem appropriate to create a body charged with these issues under the ae-
gis of the NMS.
368. Such access protocols could be tiered, such as the proposed description of "fast"
and "slow" markets in Regulation NMS. See Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at
11,129-30.
369. While the Commission does not have rate-making authority under the Exchange
Act, the Commission is empowered to ensure that fees charged by exchanges and SROs for
market data are not so excessive as to "impose[ ] any burden on competition not necessary
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes" of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-
l(b)(5)(B) (2000). The SEC exercised this authority in an order requiring the NASD to pro-
vide a cost-based justification for the fee it charged competing data vendors for a data feed
containing individual market maker quotes. Order Announcing Commission Findings, Ex-
change Act Release No. 20,874, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,640, 17,643 (Apr. 24, 1984). The order was
upheld in NASD v. SEC, 801 F.2d 1415, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
370. The Commission has previously considered whether discriminatory denials of ac-
cess should be appealable to the Commission in the context of Regulation ATS. See Regu-
lation of Exchanges and ATS Proposing Release, supra note 329, at 23,520, 23,539-40;
Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 4, at 70,901.
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ments-that "qualified securities" must meet to be eligible for
trading in the national market system. Any attempt by the Com-
mission to establish national listing standards resembling ex-
change or NASDAQ listing standards would likely be considered,
in light of Business Roundtable v. SEC, to exceed the Commis-
sion's authority under the Exchange Act.37' It has also been pref-
erable to allow exchanges to determine the quantitative thresh-
olds for sustaining liquidity on their systems rather than to
establish them by regulation.372 Commission rules thus do not de-
fine which securities are subject to its "national market system"
rules, but rather refer to those securities designated as "national
market system" securities by each plan or its participating self-
regulatory organizations."'
Allowing the governing participants of a national market sys-
tem to dictate in concert the minimum corporate governance
standards for trading on a national market system is another way
to address this problem.374 Unlike the listing standards promul-
gated by individual exchanges, listing standards developed jointly
by major market participants and enforced would be insulated
from competitive pressure.37 Issuers would have an incentive,
but not an obligation, to comply in order to obtain public dissemi-
nation of trade and quote information and public access to major
371. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The power to desig-
nate securities as 'qualified' for trading on the national market system is necessarily con-
strained by Congress's purposes in authorizing the Commission to foster that system.".).
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did acknowledge, however, that
the Commission might be able to establish "qualifications relevant to inclusion within any
particular information database," such as the amount of trading activity or type of secu-
rity. Id.
372. See Poser, supra note 72, at 901-12 (discussing failed SEC attempts to establish
criteria for national market system securities in the 1970s).
373. Proposed Regulation NMS, supra note 5, at 11,192-93.
374. This approach would differ from the SEC's approach to defining qualified securi-
ties in the 1970s by (i) focusing on corporate governance standards rather than quantita-
tive criteria, which would be left to individual markets, and (ii) delegating the establish-
ment and maintenance of such standards to market centers themselves, while giving the
SEC the power to approve or disapprove.
375. This is not unlike an alternative proposed by the ABA Committee, in which corpo-
rate governance standards would be developed by an industry SRO. See ABA Market
Structure Study, supra note 2, at 1490. Issuer participation in the development of stan-
dards for secondary markets by a national market system governing body may be appro-
priate, although it is difficult to conceive of a mechanism for ensuring representative
membership of public issuers that would have the authority to impose collective govern-
ance standards for all public issuers.
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markets for their securities. 6 Denial of access to the national
market system, moreover, would carry with it as significant a re-
putational loss as exchange listing does today.
Like exchange listing standards, however, minimum qualifica-
tions adopted pursuant to a national market system plan would
be subject to public notice and comment and Commission ap-
proval. 7 As with SRO rule making today, this would allow the
Commission to block listing requirements that are perceived as
arbitrary or anticompetitive, and preserve the Commission's abil-
ity to influence markets to develop heightened corporate govern-
ance or other listing standards as the need arises. Initiatives such
as Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance standards, for exam-
ple, could be executed by national market system governing par-
ticipants, rather than individual markets with different enforce-
ment priorities.
Under such a structure, moreover, markets such as the NYSE
and NASDAQ would retain their own listing standards-and, if
ultimately deemed appropriate, be permitted to modify them
without Commission approval, subject to antitrust scrutiny. The
listing standards developed by an individual market would relate
to individual market's reputational interest and the liquidity of
securities and suitability for trading in a particular system-such
as specialists, market makers, or unique trading methodologies-
provided by that market. Such considerations, however, would be
uncoupled from the Commission's broader concerns relating to
corporate governance.
Ensuring that Plans adopt corporate governance standards and
enforce them, e.g., through the limitation or denial of access to
national market system mechanisms, may pose some regulatory
challenges for the Commission. One approach might be to allow
the Plan to collect a listing fee for national market system securi-
ties to fund the maintenance of national market system mecha-
nisms; the Commission would then retain the authority to with-
hold or prevent increases in the fee. Another may be to require
automatic suspension of noncompliant issuers within a certain
period of time, absent reinstatement subject to Commission re-
376. Individual markets could, as today, create mechanisms for trading or supplying
liquidity to other securities, e.g., the NASDAQ OTC Bulletin Board, subject to mandatory
disclosures that such securities do not meet national market system standards.
377. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Aa3-2(b) (2004).
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view. Such provisions, however, would be the subject of negotia-
tion between the Commission and the Plan participants, as adop-
tion and enforcement of corporate governance listing standards
are today.
C. Member Regulation
While certain self-regulatory responsibilities are ripe for dele-
gation to a national market system, member regulation, for his-
torical, operational, and reputational reasons, is the one for which
a national market system solution might not be ideal. Unlike
trading or listing, there does not appear to be direct competition
for member regulatory services other than the NYSE and the
NASD Regulation, no other existing or prospective exchange or
national securities association is equipped or has evidenced a
willingness to regulate the public business of its members. Ac-
cordingly, the question is whether the Commission or the NYSE's
members collectively trust the NYSE to regulate member busi-
ness conduct.
The basic alternatives are set forth in the academic literature
and Commission releases described above.37 A better answer,
however, may simply be to allow the NYSE's member regulation
function to live out its usefulness within the modified framework
discussed herein. Given the NYSE's reliance on listing, transac-
tion, and market data revenues to fund self-regulation, one could
imagine that at some point the NYSE might relinquish member
regulation entirely if it finds it cannot compete effectively with
other markets that do not provide self-regulatory services. More-
over, as broker-dealers acquire, are acquired by, or otherwise con-
solidate with other providers of financial services, there will be
greater domestic and international pressure to regulate the bro-
ker-dealers' financial responsibility and record keeping group-
wide; such developments may well reduce the spheres of interest
in which NYSE member regulation is thought to have the most
advantage.379
378. See supra notes 224-63 and accompanying text.
379. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i) (2000) (providing a framework for Commission super-
vision of investment bank holding companies, including record-keeping and reporting re-
quirements and examination authority); Supervised Investment Bank Holding Compa-
nies, Exchange Act Release No. 49,831, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,472, 34,473 (June 21, 2004)
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VI. CONCLUSION
The 1975 Amendments embraced two perhaps inconsistent
frameworks for market regulation-one rooted in the history of
stock exchanges and one rooted in the possibility of technologi-
cally advanced markets. As the exchanges that once served as the
epicenter of trading activity struggle with the challenges posed by
new entrants, legislators and regulators must ensure that the al-
location of regulatory responsibilities and privileges does not un-
reasonably limit the benefits of increased competition or the effec-
tiveness of industry regulation. Reviving confidence in both self-
regulation and the competitiveness of the securities markets is a
difficult balancing act, but one which is necessary to ensure the
continued preeminence of the U.S. securities markets.
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 240) (adopting final rules creating a new framework for su-
pervising an investment bank holding company).
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